Across the American political firmament, from far-left progressives to centrist Republicans and Democrats to far-right conservatives, a remarkable new consensus is forming and gathering strength: put “America First” once again. Out with the unwanted burdens of U.S. global hegemony in the guise of primus inter pares to prevent the emergence of rival regional hegemons outside the Americas, in with reaping the fruits of tending and cultivating the United States’s backyard: the homeland and the rest of the Americas.
President Donald Trump, in his first incarnation, gave voice to this emerging new political reality with the slogan “Make America Great Again” and resuscitated the core belief that the nation’s manifest destiny can only be realized by putting America First from sea to shining sea.
Unfortunately, in his second incarnation, Trump seems to have lost his way and forgotten his promises. Instead of disengaging from foreign entanglements and setting a course to come home, he has been lured by the siren calls of continued U.S. global hegemony — the glittering fool’s gold of wielding American power on behalf of legacy client states and security dependencies spread across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
So, here we are with a losing Trump trifecta. First, the U.S. is enmeshed in a de facto, proxy war with Russia, via American shipments of military equipment to Ukraine and economic war in the form of comprehensive economic sanctions in response to Moscow’s actions to prevent Ukraine from slipping out of Russia’s historic sphere of influence. Second, the U.S. is engaged in an increasingly open-ended tariff war with China and is saber-rattling over Beijing’s attempts to restore and reassert its sovereignty over Taiwan and the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan. Third, Trump unilaterally launched a devastating kinetic war on Iran on Feb. 28, which, on its current trajectory, threatens to morph into a “forever war.”
The losing Trump trifecta reflects the consequences, albeit unintended, of legacy commitments to Europe, via the 1949 NATO treaty; Japan, via the 1960 treaty of mutual cooperation; Taiwan, via the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act; and Saudi Arabia and Israel, via numerous presidential and congressional declarations. Although the conflicts with Russia, China, and Iran were not created by Trump, they have been embraced by him. He now has the unenviable task of crafting exits from them, which he must do as a matter of the utmost urgency.
Trump is the quintessential businessman and dealmaker. He understands that not every venture succeeds, so cutting losses is part of winning the ultimate prize: a vibrant, prosperous, and secure homeland coupled with perpetual U.S. hegemony over the rest of the Americas. Ultimately, what matters is winning the war despite losing battles.
The centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy, as articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy, is crystal clear: defense of the homeland and the rest of the Americas as the exclusive sphere of influence, buffered by a maritime and airspace cordon sanitaire in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
Trump also has a keen eye for opportunity, and its name is the Americas, also known as the Western Hemisphere. He has already presciently identified two possible long-term winners, Argentina and Venezuela, and shrewdly put down a marker for Greenland. So, there is a winning Trump trifecta that could be his magnificent bequest to future generations of Americans.
In fact, the invisible hand of the capital markets is clearly signaling that the combination of the U.S. and the rest of the Americas outperforms the combination of the U.S. and its major legacy client states.
An investment portfolio composed of listed U.S. equity securities, 80%, and listed equity securities of the other Americas’ big four — Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 20%, with each of the countries equally weighted — delivered an impressive annual rate of return of 22% for the most recent one-year period ending July 31 per the respective MSCI equity indices for the relevant countries. Over the comparable three-, five-, and 10-year periods, the annual returns were also quite robust: 19%, 14%, and 14%, respectively.
By contrast, an investment portfolio of listed U.S. equity securities, 80%, and listed equity securities of the quintet of major legacy client states — the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and Australia, 20%, with each of the countries equally weighted — delivered a lower annual rate of return of 19% for the most recent 1-year period ending July 31. Over the comparable three-, five-, and 10-year periods, the annual returns were also lower: 18%, 12%, and 14%, respectively.
The economic fundamentals validate and underpin the outperformance of the other Americas’ portfolio relative to the legacy client states portfolio.
According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2025, the real GDP growth rate of the U.S. was 2.3%. The respective real GDP growth rates for Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were: 1.5%, 1.6%, 1.9%, and 3.5%. The respective real GDP growth rates for the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, and Australia were much weaker: 0.8%, 0.9%, 0.8%, 0.7%, and 2%.
Based on IMF projections, the other Americas’ big four will collectively outperform the quintet of major legacy states in terms of real GDP growth over the next three years.
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Mesmerized by the mirage of preserving U.S. global hegemony by slaying illusory foreign dragons, Trump is neglecting to address the trifecta of existential challenges that could fracture the very foundations of the nation: a deluge of illegal and otherwise unwanted immigrants, a flood of illicit drugs from abroad, and a mushrooming federal debt that dwarfs the size of the economy. There are long-standing promises to keep at home.
It’s time to walk the talk and put America First once again.
Samir Tata is the founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, and the author of the book Reflections on Grand Strategy: The Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century.