The United Kingdom arrested a 41-year-old U.S. Army soldier on Tuesday. Identified by the Wall Street Journal as Lt. Col. Brandon Tyner, the soldier is suspected of spying for Russia. The Journal reports that Tyner was caught in a U.K.-led sting operation.
This incident reminds us that Moscow does not limit its espionage activities to cyber-operations and violent action. Russia also finds occasional, high-value success in penetrating U.S. and British counterintelligence efforts. Numerous former U.S. intelligence officers have told me they believe that the U.S. intelligence community harbors multiple Russian agents, for example. Fortunately, in this case, it appears that Tyner’s engagement with Russian intelligence was intercepted before actual intelligence was handed over.
Tyner was serving at NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps at the British Army’s Imjin Barracks base. That Corps is responsible for generating immediate response land forces amid an attack, or imminent attack, on NATO. Russia would obviously have great interest in the Corps’ activity. After all, were Moscow aware of the Corps’ plans and its operational timelines to respond to a limited military incursion or major invasion of Estonia, for example, Russia would shape its own planning on the basis of that information. As a lieutenant colonel, Tyner had significant expertise and extensive access to classified information. Because of the embarrassment this arrest brings to the U.S. Army, and because the soldier was serving on foreign soil, the evidence gathered is presumably compelling.
As an extension, although its agent appears to have been caught, Russia has reminded us that it remains determined to conduct conventional espionage. In this case, Russia’s GRU military intelligence service is likely responsible for recruiting and “running” the soldier as an agent. If not, Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence service would be the main culprit. But if the GRU is indeed responsible, this case would mark a departure from the GRU’s better-known penchant for assassinations and violent activity. The GRU has masterminded numerous terrorist attacks on European soil and U.S.-bound aircraft in recent years. The agency has also been instrumental in the so-called “Havana Syndrome” attacks on U.S. government and military personnel.
It’s unclear how the GRU recruited this soldier. But we can make some educated guesses.
Favored GRU techniques include targeted recruitment via encrypted messaging apps, blackmail, cash-for-secrets, and the use of “honey trap” sexual lures (as with the Chinese MSS cultivation of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang). All of these tactics may be employed in tandem. Sometimes the lovers become girlfriends (or boyfriends), and even wives (or husbands). This can lead agents to believe they are conducting espionage not for the service of a foreign power, but in the delusional belief it is for love or affection. Due to Russia’s poor reputation in many Western states, Russian intelligence officers periodically pretend they are spies belonging to a friendlier nation. This is known as a “false flag” recruitment.
It is also worth noting that the GRU has been under extensive surveillance by the U.K.’s MI5 domestic intelligence service since the Skripal poisoning attack in 2018. Along with diplomatic expulsions and identity-detection efforts by the U.K.’s GCHQ signals intelligence service, these have dampened the GRU’s operational effectiveness.
Still, GRU officers in the U.K. continue to show sporadic adeptness in performing their secret work. They seek to create credible, harmless cover stories for why they are traveling and doing what they are doing. This sometimes allows them to lower their MI5 threat assessments and the associated surveillance packages assigned to monitor them. At least once in recent years, a GRU officer has used this strategy to approach a new recruitment target (the target reported the approach to their superiors).
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We’ll learn more if and when charges are filed, and the case proceeds to trial. But don’t be surprised if the Russian intelligence tradecraft involved here appears less shoddy than usual. The SVR, FSB, and GRU have their fair share of fools. But there are serious spies among them.
And those spies are dedicated American adversaries.
