President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have developed something unusual in U.S.-China relations: a diplomacy increasingly centered on the two leaders themselves.
Xi’s September visit to Washington followed Trump’s May summit with him in Beijing, with further encounters possible at international gatherings later this year.
The latest meeting produced targeted tariff reductions, an extension of the trade truce, and new dialogue mechanisms. The two sides agreed to pursue tariff reductions covering roughly $30 billion of goods in each direction and established additional channels for discussion, including on artificial intelligence. Yet the major strategic disagreements remained largely untouched.
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The personal relationship, meanwhile, has become almost surreal.
Trump and Xi shake hands, exchange compliments, dine together, and project stability. Strategic competition continues underneath, but at the very top, the relationship appears remarkably cordial.
That makes the approaching U.S. midterm elections more consequential for Beijing than they might initially appear.
Trump’s domestic political position has weakened considerably, at least according to recent polls. A September Reuters/Ipsos poll put his approval rating at 32%, while Democrats held an 8-point advantage over Republicans when voters were asked which party they would support for Congress.
No national poll determines congressional control, of course. House races are decided district by district, and Senate contests state by state. But Beijing surely understands the broader implications if Republicans lose ground: Trump could emerge from November confronting a Washington substantially less receptive to his personalized approach toward Xi.
From bully to buffer?
The irony is striking.
Trump can hardly be described as traditionally “pro-China.” He launched the original trade war, imposed tariffs, tightened technology restrictions, and repeatedly accused Beijing of taking advantage of the United States.
Yet within today’s Washington, Trump may also be the most powerful political figure personally invested in maintaining a workable relationship with Xi.
That distinction matters when we look one level below him.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio built much of his Senate foreign-policy reputation around confronting the Chinese Communist Party, and Beijing sanctioned him in 2020. Vice President JD Vance represents a somewhat different tendency: nationalist, Make America Great Again-oriented, and generally more focused on domestic priorities and limiting American commitments abroad.
Congress presents an even clearer challenge for Beijing: skepticism toward China has become strikingly bipartisan.
Democrats and Republicans may disagree fiercely about Trump. They disagree considerably less about the need to compete with China on technology, supply chains, Taiwan, military power, and trade.
This creates a peculiar structure in U.S.-China relations.
At the presidential level, there is summit diplomacy, personal detente, and an apparent desire to keep disagreements from spinning out of control. One level below, however, much of the American political system continues moving toward tougher competition.
The unusual reality is that today’s U.S.-China stability may depend less on a durable political consensus than on the personal relationship between two presidents.
Could a weaker Trump mean a tougher Washington?
The question, therefore, is not simply whether China would prefer Republicans or Democrats to prevail in November. The more important question is what happens to Trump himself afterward.
A president who loses congressional leverage does not become powerless. Foreign policy remains an area in which presidents possess substantial authority. But political freedom of maneuver can narrow. Congressional investigations can multiply, legislation can constrain policy, and members of the president’s own party can begin positioning themselves for the next election.
If Trump emerges politically weakened after November, pressure could grow from several directions at once.
Democrats could press him harder on trade, labor standards, and human rights. Congressional Republicans could demand stronger action on Taiwan, technology, and national security. Republicans positioning themselves for 2028 could seek greater distance from Trump’s personalized diplomacy. And Trump himself, facing criticism that summitry with Xi produced more ceremony than concessions, could conclude that a tougher China policy better serves his domestic political interests.
Taiwan provides an immediate test.
Washington continues moving forward with major arms and security support for Taiwan, while lawmakers in both parties remain wary of any appearance that U.S. commitments are being softened in pursuit of better relations with Beijing.
Iran presents another complication. Washington sees Beijing as one of the outside powers with significant economic leverage over Tehran. Reuters has also reported continued Chinese-Iranian commerce through mechanisms designed to avoid conventional financial channels and U.S. sanctions.
With the United States now deeply entangled in confrontation with Iran, pressure on Trump to demand more from Xi could increase substantially after the midterm elections.
Taiwan, Iran, technology controls, or trade could therefore become the issue that tests how much political capital Trump is prepared to spend protecting his detente with Xi.
None of these outcomes is inevitable. But together they expose the vulnerability of the current arrangement.
The Trump-Xi summit model has created something valuable: direct communication between the leaders of the world’s two most powerful countries. Given the military, economic, and technological stakes, keeping those channels open is hardly trivial.
But a relationship resting too heavily on two personalities is inherently fragile.
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Beijing may therefore be watching Nov. 3 not simply to see which party controls Congress, but to answer a much larger question:
After the midterm elections, how much political authority will Trump still possess to manage China in his own way?
David W. Wang (@DavidWWang203) is a senior international business executive, geopolitical affairs consultant, analyst, and writer based in the Washington, D.C., metro area.