President Donald Trump did what none of his predecessors would attempt. Nicolas Maduro is awaiting trial in a New York courtroom rather than ruling from Miraflores. That was the hard part, and the president deserves credit for it. The question now is whether what Washington builds after Maduro’s removal will still be standing 10 years from now.
On Aug. 29, Trump announced what he called the “biggest oil deal in world history.” The agreement would give North American Blue Energy Partners concessions across 17 fields containing roughly 65 billion barrels, while the Department of War would receive a 35% stake in the parent company, and the State Department would have the right to purchase a fifth of production at cost.
The deal reflects Washington’s determination to reshape Venezuela’s economy. But it also exposes a weakness in the Trump administration’s broader strategy. Washington appears to believe that economic opening can come first, with political transformation following once Venezuela becomes more prosperous and stable. In Venezuela, that sequence risks getting things backward.
Democracy is not merely a question of political legitimacy. For Venezuela, it is closely tied to the economic conditions needed to attract serious long-term investment. Companies committing billions of dollars to projects with investment horizons measured in decades need confidence that contracts will survive political transitions, property rights will be protected, and courts will constrain government power. Venezuela’s extraordinary reserves cannot compensate for uncertainty over who will control the country or what rules will apply tomorrow.
The reluctance of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips underscores the core challenge. Both companies know Venezuela well and have strong commercial reasons to return. Yet their hesitation reflects the legacy of expropriations, shifting regulations, and weak legal protections.
ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods has described Venezuela as “uninvestable” under its existing framework and called for stronger protections for investors, as well as changes to the country’s hydrocarbons legislation. Exxon has already seen its Venezuelan assets seized twice. ConocoPhillips has similarly emphasized policy stability, security, the rule of law, competitive markets, and mechanisms to resolve Venezuela’s outstanding obligations.
The message from these companies is difficult to ignore. Venezuela does not lack resources. It lacks the institutional conditions that allow capital to remain confident over time. That makes the current oil strategy potentially self-defeating. Rebuilding Venezuela’s energy sector will require enormous investments in production, infrastructure, and services. Those projects cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of today’s oil prices or the preferences of today’s government. Investors must consider whether agreements negotiated now will remain enforceable after a change in Caracas.
Delcy Rodriguez’s government should therefore not be treated as a definitive institutional break with the Maduro era simply because it is cooperating with Washington and opening the economy to foreign investment. If the political networks and governing practices that sustained the previous system remain intact, the underlying sources of political risk remain as well.
There is another vulnerability. The Trump administration itself will eventually leave office. A future U.S. president may change sanctions policy, revise Washington’s relationship with Caracas, or place greater emphasis on democratic governance. A Venezuela strategy built around the relationship between one U.S. administration and one unelected Venezuelan government is therefore exposed to political change on both sides.
Washington should consequently stop treating economic reconstruction and democratic transition as separate objectives. They are mutually reinforcing.
Elections alone will not rebuild Venezuela. The country will still need judicial reform, infrastructure investment, debt restructuring, energy-sector reform, and stronger public security. But competitive elections, independent electoral institutions, and meaningful checks on executive power can help create the political environment in which those reforms become durable. A government with democratic legitimacy is also better positioned to negotiate agreements that future administrations and political factions have less incentive to overturn.
The United States has considerable leverage in Venezuela today. It can use that leverage to secure access to oil and accelerate production. But it can also press for the institutional reforms that would make those investments sustainable. Washington does not need to dictate Venezuela’s political future. It needs to help create conditions under which Venezuelans can determine their future through legitimate institutions.
WANT LOWER ELECTRIC BILLS? LET UTILITIES BUILD POWER PLANTS AGAIN
That is the real test of Trump’s Venezuela policy. The question is not whether Washington can make a favorable deal with Venezuela today. It is whether it can help build a Venezuela in which American companies will trust those agreements 20 years from now.
If Trump wants Venezuela to become a lasting foreign policy success, democracy cannot be postponed until after the oil sector is rebuilt. It is part of what will make that reconstruction possible.
Imdat Oner is a former Turkish diplomat who served in Caracas, Venezuela, and he currently works as a senior policy analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy.