Why did Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev become an ultra-hawk?
Tom Rogan
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What happened to Dmitry Medvedev? Once a moderate who balanced deference to Russian President Vladimir Putin alongside a genuine effort to improve relations with the West, the former president is now an ultra-hawk.
Serving as president during Putin’s 2008-2012 interregnum, Medvedev was viewed by the U.S. intelligence community as a genuine reformer. As a leader who intended to inject compromise (rather than spray Novichok) into U.S.-Russia relations. This assessment underpinned the Obama administration’s ill-fated attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow. It saw former President Barack Obama take Medvedev for burgers and Medvedev praise Obama as “a very pleasant man who it’s a pleasure to deal with.”
That Medvedev bears stark contrast with today’s Medvedev, now serving as deputy chairman of the national security council. In 2023, Medvedev very closely echoes the rhetoric of master-hawk national security secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who refers to Ukrainians as “beasts” destined to clean the overflowing excrement of U.S. foreign policy. Consider Medvedev’s recent posts to his favorite Telegram social media channel.
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On Friday, Medvedev lamented Ukraine’s predictable rejection of a 36-hour Orthodox Christmas ceasefire offered by Putin. Kyiv’s decision was understandable, Medvedev said, because “pigs have no faith.” He then described German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock as an “illiterate grandmother” heir to the Nazis who serves at the “European pigsty.”
On Thursday, describing the U.S. State Department as “top-notch freaks” and “sons of bitches,” Medvedev claimed that U.S. policy in Ukraine centered on “exterminating thousands of people by proxy” in “the best traditions of the Nazis.” Referencing the Atlantic deployment of a new Russian warship armed with hypersonic weapons, Medvedev called for the warship to “stand somewhere 100 miles from the coast, closer to the [Washington, D.C., intersecting] Potomac River.”
On Dec. 28, Medvedev attacked as “traitors” those Russians who opposed the war in Ukraine. Perhaps in extrajudicial reference to Russian oligarchs who have recently died in strange window-centric circumstances, Medvedev observed that the “traitors” must be treated as “enemies of the state … even if no one initiated any administrative or criminal cases against [them].”
On Dec. 26, Medvedev offered 10 satirical predictions for 2023, including the formation of a Fourth Reich.
More instructive, however, was Medvedev’s 5,600-word essay that same day for the Russian Gazette (the government newspaper of record). Assessing the global situation, Medvedev sought to channel Putin’s 7,000-word July 2021 screed on a coming showdown with Ukraine.
Declaring that “our world has changed” and “forever,” Medvedev pledged that Russia would continue with its “denazification of the disgusting, almost fascist regime of Ukraine.” Rejecting the likely necessity of far more circumspect objectives in Ukraine, Medvedev committed to the “complete demilitarization of the Ukrainian state” and its “guarantees against aggression in the future.” Then came the hate. The Polish, of course, were front and center. The Ukrainian government consists of “cannabis-smoking cannibals.” The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania “have put themselves in the most stupid position. Provincial narrow-mindedness, rudeness, manners of thieving lackeys.” Playing to Putin’s threats to Estonia, Medvedev warned that “in the near future, social explosions in these states will lead to an inevitable change of power.”
Yet, befitting the enduring Kremlin hawk conception of the United States as their “Main Enemy,” it was the U.S. that earned Medvedev’s defining ire. Americans, he says, “are still trying to pretend that the whole world is their colony, to dictate enslaving conditions, to behave without regard to law and morality, to rob at every step.” Outlining escalating living and heating costs in Europe, Medvedev declares that “one can only sympathize with ordinary citizens of the EU countries.” He asks why America is the only one with “relative gain.” This reflects a familiar Soviet-Russian narrative that is designed to divide an inherently malicious U.S. from its mistreated European allies.
But why has Medvedev made such a significant shift from moderate to ultra-hawk?
I suspect it’s down to two factors: Medvedev’s desire to balance high-level influence and the expanding influence of others over him.
Medvedev likely sees very little benefit to maintaining his prior moderate credentials. The war in Ukraine now defines Russian political culture. The most high-ranking moderate, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, now fastidiously avoids rocking the reform boat. But as the nominal No. 2 official on the national security council under Putin, Medvedev has at least some awareness of just how badly the war is going for Russia. To offer moderation in the face of that challenge would risk undermining Putin’s all-in public pronouncements on the war. It would thus fundamentally jeopardize Medvedev’s own position. Medvedev knows he was made by Putin and could be broken by Putin.
That leads to the influence of others. I describe Medvedev as the “nominal” No. 2 security council official for a reason. Because the power behind the council throne is not Medvedev but rather Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev. Where Medvedev’s council position does afford some formal responsibility, Patrushev’s role comes with 21 different constitutionally ascribed responsibilities. These include ensuring “the implementation of the tasks and functions assigned to the Security Council.”
Via long-term experience, cultivated relationships, and his imposition of fear, Patrushev is the gatekeeper to the Russian intelligence and security apparatus. Master of the “siloviki” security men, Patrushev is linked to numerous murders, assassinations, and covert action campaigns. Patrushev also has great influence over Medvedev’s security council activity. Most specifically, via the legal authority born of Security Council Regulation 22. This states that “information, analytical, organizational and technical support for the activities of the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council is provided by the staff of the Security Council.” AKA Patrushev. And whether he actually believes it or not, what Medvedev is now saying is what Patrushev says and believes.
Top line: Medvedev appears to have decided that retaining power in 2023 Russia requires hawkishness. It’s not a good time to be a Moscow moderate.
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