Russia is making mistakes beyond Ukraine. Why won’t the US take advantage of them?

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People may debate aid for Ukraine, but as the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion nears, one thing is clear: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to go to war was a mistake. What Putin envisioned as a two-day cakewalk to Kyiv is now a war of attrition. Russia has lost a quarter of its troops. Many more young men have fled conscription. Even if Russia formalized its Anschluss of the Donbas, the cost to Russia’s prestige and economic potential was hardly worth it.

President Joe Biden may not have been able to dissuade Russia from its error, but he was able to raise its price. While both populists and progressive Democrats suggest that money used to support Ukraine should instead be spent domestically, they err in two ways. First, the United States spends much of that money domestically, putting American manufacturers to work, and second, the cost to support Ukraine is a pittance of that which any direct battle with Russia would extract. More valid criticisms of Biden’s approach to Ukraine would be his effort to micromanage the conflict and his tendency to provide only enough weaponry to continue the fight but not win.

That said, exploiting Russia’s mistake has been crucial to blunting its power. The threat Russia poses today to Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics is a fraction of that which Russia posed before the 2022 invasion.

Putin’s self-image as a flawless and virile strongman belies the fact he is a deeply flawed leader who has brought Russia ruin on a number of fronts. Perhaps it is time to exploit Putin’s other mistakes.

Consider Armenia, once among Russia’s most solid diplomatic allies. Armenians relied on Russia for protection against Turkey. The alliance between the two countries was of both heart and mind, yet within just two years, Putin’s arrogance and incompetence have flipped Armenia. Armenians resent how Putin greenlighted Azerbaijan’s 2020 aggression and ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh to avenge Armenia’s turn toward democracy. When Armenians refused subsequently to overthrow their democratically elected government, Russian agents clumsily sought to provoke a coup by bribing Armenian counterparts. It did not work: Armenians instead arrested the Russian agents. Today, Armenia is among the most pro-Western countries in the South Caucasus, while Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia all pivot to Moscow or Beijing.

Alas, neither the U.S. nor Europe does enough to consolidate its gain: providing Armenia with the economic infrastructure and partnerships and military support it needs to send the remaining Russian troops packing.

Had the Senate not rejected a mandate for Armenia in 1920, the Soviet Union could never have consolidated its control over the region. Washington should not make the same mistake twice, sacrificing a pro-Western country to the autocracies surrounding it. Rather, it should consolidate military ties to Armenia while simultaneously publicizing the refusal of Russian peacekeepers to stop aggression so that no other country accepts their presence on its territory.

Even the Islamic Republic of Iran is upset with Russian cynicism. After Iran sacrificed sovereignty to allow Russian forces onto its territory and helped supply Russian forces with drones, Moscow turned around and endorsed Emirati sovereignty over three disputed islands. The Emiratis are the sovereign power, but every country laying out the red carpet for Russia should realize what a fair-weather, inconsistent friend the Kremlin will be when a better offer comes along.

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Then, there is the Wagner Group. Far from the invincible force that rocketed across Africa, the group’s legacy is often failure. Long before Ukrainians transformed its mercenaries into minced meat, Mozambiquan insurgents sent the group packing. Perhaps had the U.S. publicized such failures, would-be African dictators would have thought twice about turning over their resources to Wagner and its Kremlin backers.

Americans tend to project strength onto adversaries while highlighting American division. Self-flagellation and self-deterrence snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. To deter enemies and win the struggle against revisionists requires the opposite. It is time to call out Russia’s weakness and ridicule Putin’s mistakes.

Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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