Israel’s very poor options for governing post-war Gaza
Tom Rogan
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Tensions are brewing over how Gaza should be governed when Israel’s war with Hamas concludes.
Israel’s stated objective is the total destruction of Hamas. But while its forces can very significantly degrade the terrorist group’s military and political apparatus, Israel is unlikely able to eliminate Hamas entirely. To do so would require eliminating the ideological support that Hamas accrues. Yet Israel’s longer-term security and potential for improved relations with the Palestinians means that it needs whoever controls Gaza to do so productively — or at least somewhat productively. Gaza will thus need a political authority that provides for meaningful improvements to Palestinian lives, supports Israeli counterterrorism and security concerns, and pursues eventual Palestinian democratic governance.
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The problem?
There are no obvious options for governing Gaza in compatibility with these ambitions. Take the possibility of an Israeli governing authority. The first challenge is that any Israeli political control would have no moral or political legitimacy with Gazans. Even if the Israelis were to work with international partners to pump aid and economic support into Gaza, their presence would fuel the broader undercurrents of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, galvanizing a new generation of terrorists. It would also undermine U.S. national security interests in terms of maintaining close relations with allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
How about the restoration of the Palestinian Authority’s control in Gaza?
Well, while it retains (technical) control in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority comes with a lot of baggage. Deeply corrupt, broadly incompetent, and led by the geriatric Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy has gradually degraded in the West Bank. The rise of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is perhaps the most clarifying testament to Abbas’s failure. Any control by the Palestinian Authority in Gaza would thus risk being caught between Israeli counterterrorism demands, Hamas remnants, a popular Gazan rejection of its credibility, and its own structural incompetence.
The only alternative remaining would appear to be a framework involving international multinational groups such as the United Nations and regional actors such as Egypt and Jordan. Again, however, familiar problems are present. Would Israel trust the U.N. to provide for its security concerns? This is no small problem, considering the failure of the U.N. mission to protect Israel’s northern border from the Lebanese Hezbollah. And while Jordanian-Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation is generally excellent, Jordan and Egypt would be reticent to undertake the heavy lifting and politically toxic work of managing Gaza’s post-war reconstruction. They would fear being seen as Israeli puppets and betrayers of the Palestinian cause. And they would fear how this would affect their own domestic political standing.
Put simply, even if it’s far from ideal that Israel isn’t offering much in terms of its plans for post-war Gaza, it’s hardly surprising.