How Biden’s new drone policy will weaken counterterrorism efforts
Tom Rogan
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President Joe Biden introduced new restrictions on the use of drone strikes in counterterrorism operations outside of active war zones. As reported by the New York Times, the new rules have four main components.
First, they restrict so-called “signature strikes” against groups of terrorists when some of those in the group have not been individually identified. Second, they prohibit strikes absent the “near certainty” that no civilians will be harmed. Third, they limit strikes to situations in which it would be “infeasible” for special forces to capture a target otherwise. Fourth, Biden must personally authorize strikes in which Americans are not at imminent risk. These new rules follow other Biden administration restrictions to include the requirement that the State Department’s top representative in any nation sign off on any strike.
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These regulations are misguided in motive, divorced from military realities, and threaten national security.
Some disagree. Although it rightly notes that the “near certainty” rule might encourage terrorists to use more human shields and that it’s “essential to avoid tying military and CIA operators’ hands too tightly,” the Washington Post suggests that Biden “appears to have gotten it mostly — but perhaps not totally — right.” This is far too generous, in my view. Instead, I see problems with each element of Biden’s rules.
1) The no to “signature strikes” problem
Consider this theoretical scenario. A U.S. drone flying over Yemen is following two known members of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. There is strong intelligence indicating that the men are on their way to meet a bombmaker who has developed an ingenious new means of smuggling explosives onto passenger airlines. After a 20-minute drive, the men meet up with five other men. Three of the other men are armed. The two groups greet each other individually with embraces and kisses. They then huddle together in discussion. Biden’s rules would feasibly prohibit this strike. And even if Biden or another senior official were to authorize a strike, the “signature strike” restriction would almost certainly cause delays in getting approval. Approval would likely take far longer than the window of opportunity allowed. Does this rule support U.S. national security? I don’t think so.
2) The “near certainty” of no civilian casualties problem
Contrary to media reporting, existing CIA and military rules heavily restrict drone strikes. These rules entail drone operators and supporting intelligence officers missing multiple opportunities to kill a priority target, sometimes over months, to mitigate risk to civilians. This frustrates effective counterterrorism efforts, but it is morally and politically necessary. However, the “near certainty” rule means that terrorists now have a prima facie incentive to surround themselves with civilians at all times. They already do so regularly in awareness of U.S. rules of engagement. Now, they have a de facto “get-out-of-death-free card.”
This restriction will also serve to limit the kind of munitions that drones employ. While low or no explosive warheads can achieve results, as with former al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri (who was killed by a bladed warhead), they offer a lower probability of success. And if a terrorist survives a drone strike, he or she will immediately go underground. Finding the terrorist again will be a lot more difficult.
Consider what this means if the terrorist in question is a bombmaker or other strategic priority. When Mohammed Emwazi, also known as “Jihadi John,” was disintegrated by a Hellfire missile as he exited a Raqqah building in November 2015, he was killed without civilian casualties. He was, however, next to a car and on a civilian street at the time. Emwazi’s death was a major blow to the Islamic State’s propaganda narratives and a delivery of justice for his torture/beheading campaigns. That said, Biden’s new rule would likely have prohibited the civilian street location for the strike. Authorizing officers would have had to fear excessively the otherwise low risk of shrapnel spraying into nearby civilian homes or bodies. Does this rule support U.S. national security? I don’t think so.
3) The “infeasible” for special forces problem
This is a particularly idiotic restriction. Even if the classified clarification carries more details, the “infeasible” rule is a deliberately subjective one. It reeks of having been drawn up by a lawyer at the National Security Council rather than in concert with officers and lawyers at the CIA’s Special Activities Center and the military’s Joint Special Operations Command.
While it is not infeasible that a special forces unit could capture an al Qaeda terrorist in, say, Yemen (the U.S. has nearby bases in Djibouti and elsewhere), a predisposition to these operations in all “feasible” circumstances would be highly problematic. It would create significant time delays, making the terrorist’s escape from surveillance or effective capture far likelier. In addition, any special forces action carries an obvious risk to the personnel involved. Low-flying helicopters can crash, terrorist bullets can kill, and combat is always unpredictable. It would also incentivize terrorists, some of whom are very operationally smart, to bait a special forces raid and employ an ensuing ambush.
Moreover, the U.S. already, as with many operations targeting ISIS in Syria, prioritizes the capture of terrorists in which the interrogation of those terrorists will produce valuable intelligence. Though when the target is of limited intelligence value but an obvious threat, the use of drone strikes makes far more sense than special forces raids. Does this rule support U.S. national security? I don’t think so.
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4) The command-and-control problem
The key benefit of former President Donald Trump’s loosening of restrictions on drone strikes was its bureaucratic effect. By pushing authority for strikes downward at the CIA and Pentagon, to operational commanders and their immediate legal teams, Trump empowered speed of action and the authority of those with the most direct insight into the prospective target. Speed of action is foundational to effective military strategy.
In contrast, by now requiring subjective and/or tight new regulations, State Department chiefs of mission approvals, and sometimes Biden’s own authority for strikes, the White House has empowered the bureaucracy to do what it does best: foster lethargy and politics where speed and decisive action are most needed. We are not talking about tax policy here. We are talking about counterterrorism. Again, does this rule support U.S. national security? I don’t think so.
Top line: These rules will make it easier for more terrorists to avoid U.S. efforts to defeat them. They will make the public and our allies less safe.