The danger for Washington is not merely what Mohsen Rezaei threatens, but the possibility that he mistakes the threats themselves for a strategy — and deterrence for a license to escalate. To examine that danger, one must trace the relationship between Rezaei’s ideological formation, his rhetoric of confrontation, and the risk of strategic miscalculation.”
Rezaei must be understood within the context of the same guerrilla, violence-driven ideology of the armed Islamist terrorist group Mansouroun half a century ago — a Khomeinist terrorist organization of which he himself was a prominent member.
The tragedy is that, half a century later, he continues to bring that same disordered and destructive mindset into the realm of international relations — a delusional and confused mentality that mistakes belligerent rhetoric for power, threats for deterrence, and adventurism for courage. This is no longer merely political stupidity. It is a dangerous strategic miscalculation that could sacrifice Iran’s national security on the altar of delusions of power.
Only now, after fifty years, are NATO and the civilized world gradually beginning to realize — largely because of the Revolutionary Guard’s cyber warfare and Rezaei’s dangerous strategy — that Iran is being ruled by a gang of criminals and murderers, and that, in reality, a criminal cult has occupied Iran.
Although the threats against Europe and the Guard’s cyberattacks are tantamount to a declaration of war against NATO, from the perspective of security studies, these actions can be analyzed within the frameworks of Gray Zone Warfare and Coercive Deterrence, rather than as a declaration of war.
On Nov. 10, 2026, France attributed destructive cyberattacks targeting more than 700 commercial establishments to a unit affiliated with the Guard. Likewise, the terrorist attacks in Britain are merely the beginning of a much larger crisis that may finally awaken the world from its slumber of complacency.
These destructive and terrorist activities could escalate the confrontation between Iran and the United States into a broader conflict involving Europe, although the invocation of NATO’s Article 5 is not automatic, even in response to severe cyberattacks.
Yet what the civilized world has overlooked is the existence of terrorist figures such as Rezaei, who persistently refuses to abandon his rhetoric of humiliating Trump and threatening the U.S. This is the same man who once aspired to visit America and deliver a speech at a Washington think tank, but the CIA was reluctant to approve the issuance of a visa because of the AMIA terrorist bombing in Argentina.
In reality, however, an Islamist terrorist’s resort to such humiliating behavior may serve three possible objectives: first, to reconstruct an image of military deterrence; second, to wage psychological warfare and impose political costs on Washington; and third, to consolidate his own authority and position within the power structure. For the fundamental religious doctrine of these terrorists and saboteurs is Al Nasr bil-Ru’b — “Victory Through Terror.” They have maintained their grip on Iranian society through the perpetration of atrocities, brutal repression, and the deployment of a machinery of oppression, while confronting the international community through their machinery of terrorism and propaganda.
Rezaei’s recent threats to strike distant American military bases can likewise be interpreted through this same sinister and perverted logic.
Although the humiliation of American leaders may increase the “reputational costs of backing down” (Audience Costs) for both sides, thereby making the path to diplomacy more difficult, the reality is that diplomacy with savage mullahs and the terrorist institution of the Revolutionary Guard is nothing more than a mirage and a futile delusion.
Meanwhile, commanders of the terrorist Revolutionary Guard persistently engage in bellicose rhetoric and empty displays of bravado. Rather than interpreting the behavior of these Shiite Islamist terrorists merely as instinctive or rooted in individual personality, it must be analyzed as the product of organizational culture, political ideology, the logic of Asymmetric Warfare, and the very foundations of Islamic terrorism and Khomeinist Shiite culture.
When conventional military capabilities are disproportionately unequal, verbal threats, demonstrations of a willingness to fight, and the exaggeration of the costs of confrontation become instruments for compensating for weakness. These ridiculous, baseless, and irrational displays of bravado also serve domestic purposes: maintaining cohesion among their forces, manufacturing legitimacy, and competing to demonstrate loyalty and uncompromising militancy.
Islamist terrorists and murderous criminals such as Ahmad Vahidi and Rezaei are inadvertently laying the groundwork for a third war. They would, of course, like the CIA and Mossad to believe that the so-called “Moush-e Tabah” — Mojtaba Khamenei — is still alive and breathing, but this is nothing more than a lie. This represents a strategic danger worthy of examination, not an inevitable outcome. According to the theory of the security dilemma, behavior that one side regards as defensive and deterrent may be perceived by the opposing side as aggressive and threatening.
Consequently, repeated threats, cyber sabotage, and the possibility of attacks against American military bases in Europe could lead to an escalation of the crisis, strategic miscalculation, and the geographical expansion of the war. There has never been, and there remains, any room for an agreement with this regime within the bounds of logic and political reason. The inaction and indifference of the Western world have transformed what was once a festering abscess into a cancerous tumor that has now metastasized.
The strategic paradox of the Guard, this Islamist terrorist institution, is that it seeks to deter war through the language of threats, yet that very language may ultimately pave the way for further escalation. Unfortunately, even the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI may still be unaware of the existence of sleeper cells operating on American soil or of the Islamic Republic’s threats in the vicinity of the U.S., lacking a genuine understanding of their nature and extent.
In international relations, the most dangerous situation arises when military leaders with a history of terrorism mistake propagandistic bravado for effective deterrence and genuine military power. Major wars do not always begin with a deliberate decision to initiate hostilities; at times, they emerge from a chain of uncontrolled threats, strategic miscalculations, and failures in crisis management.
Rezaei still thinks according to the logic of an ideological guerrilla fighter. Today, however, the price of that mentality must be paid not by an armed group, but by an entire nation — and perhaps by the entire region.
Washington need not mistake Rezaei’s threats for strength. It must, however, take seriously the danger that he does. The price of that miscalculation could be paid by the Iranian people, American personnel, and a region drawn into a war its architects believed they were deterring.
Today in Washington, the directors of the CIA and Mossad are meeting to exchange views on a common threat: the regime occupying Iran. Before turning their full attention to regime change in Tehran, both intelligence agencies could once again bring an old, loyal, and trusted ally back into the field of fight: a reconstituted SAVAK.
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Both agencies should consider training Iranian patriots within Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s circle who possess expertise in domestic security and counterterrorism, equipping them with the professional knowledge and operational capabilities necessary to rebuild SAVAK following the collapse of the Islamic Republic. This regime is destined to fall. It is not destined to endure. Yet if such preparations are neglected, Iran could face the grave danger of civil war and a domestic terrorist crisis, with Islamist extremist networks operating through the country’s mosque infrastructure and exploiting the security vacuum left by the regime’s collapse.
Nor should Washington place any trust or confidence in Pakistan or Qatar. Both, in my assessment, have misled the U.S., and both are pursuing policies aimed at preserving the terrorist regime in Tehran. Of course, the directors of two of the world’s most renowned intelligence agencies are well aware of another fundamental reality: Russia is the power pulling the strings behind this entire geopolitical puppet show.
Erfan Fard is a counterterrorism analyst and Middle East studies researcher based in Washington, with a particular focus on Iran, Islamic terrorism, and ethnic conflicts in the region.