The war with Iran is teaching America an old lesson we should already know — air power can destroy, but it cannot occupy, control, or impose a lasting political settlement.
I learned that lesson during two combat tours in Vietnam and again during the 1990–91 Gulf War. Technology has changed dramatically since then; however, the fundamentals of warfare have not.
The United States and Israel have demonstrated their ability to strike Iranian military infrastructure with extraordinary precision. Yet months into the conflict, the central strategic problem remains unresolved. Iran continues to contest the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of the world’s traded oil and gas normally passes. Recent diplomacy has focused heavily on reopening that vital waterway, while military tensions remain dangerously high. And they refuse to disavow their nuclear ambitions.
That raises the question Washington should have answered before the first bomb fell: What constitutes victory?
Is the objective preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons? Permanently reopening the Strait of Hormuz? Destroying Iran’s missile capability? Changing the Iranian government’s behavior? Or changing the government itself?
Those are very different objectives requiring very different military strategies.
However, with 15 years of my life spent living and working in the Middle East, I see no way to achieve regional peace or these objectives with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remaining in power; therefore, elimination of the IRGC is the key to victory.
Vietnam taught my generation the consequences of entering a conflict without connecting military operations to a realistic political end state. Desert Storm demonstrated the opposite. There was an unspoken determination among us Vietnam veterans: failure would not occur on our watch.
When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, our objective was straightforward: Liberate Kuwait.
America also understood that it should not fight alone. A massive international coalition was assembled. Saudi Arabia provided the indispensable staging area. Coalition aircraft spent weeks systematically preparing the battlefield, attacking Iraqi command and control, air defenses, communications, logistics, artillery, and armor units.
Then came the ground forces.
They liberated Kuwait, accomplished the stated objective, and the Coalition stopped.
Iran presents a far more difficult problem, but the principle remains the same.
If the objective is simply to punish or degrade Iranian military capabilities, air and naval power may accomplish much of it. If the objective is to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely, military leaders must determine what physical control is required to make that guarantee credible.
And if the objective eventually requires seizing and holding Iranian territory, destroying hardened facilities, securing ports, or imposing conditions that Tehran refuses to accept, someone may ultimately have to put boots on the ground.
That does not necessarily mean predominantly American boots.
The 1990-91 Gulf War demonstrated the power of coalition warfare. Middle Eastern nations have the greatest stake in preventing Iran from dominating the Persian Gulf. They possess language skills, cultural understanding, geographic and historical knowledge, military forces, and, critically, regional legitimacy.
America can provide what it does exceptionally well: Intelligence, surveillance, command and control, logistics, air and naval power, precision weapons, communications and specialized capabilities. The adverse world economic impact posed by this war should also see European nations in the fight, too.
Nevertheless, Middle Eastern allies must share both the burden and the risk; after all, it’s their turf.
There is another lesson Washington should remember. Military superiority does not automatically produce strategic victory.
Precision weapons, drones, satellites, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence give commanders capabilities we could scarcely have imagined when I first went to war in Vietnam. But technology can create a dangerous illusion, a false sense of security — because we can strike almost anything, we can therefore accomplish anything.
Wrong, we cannot!
Wars remain contests of political will fought by human beings.
Before expanding this war, American leaders should answer four questions clearly: What is the objective? What constitutes victory? Whose forces will achieve it? And how do we return the region to a lasting peace?
If those questions cannot be answered, more bombs will not provide the answer.
Vietnam taught us that painful truth. Desert Storm demonstrated what happens when political objectives, coalition unity, and military power are properly synchronized.
TRUMP CAN SET ALL THE DEADLINES HE WANTS. IRAQ CAN’T DISARM IRAN’S MILITIAS
Iran is giving us another opportunity to remember.
Air and naval power can devastate an enemy. Technology can dominate a battlefield. But when the objective requires controlling territory, waterways, or eliminating rogue regimes, there remains no substitute for boots on the ground.
Tom Williams is a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel with 28 years of active-duty service, including two tours in Vietnam, evacuation of Americans from Beirut in 1976, and the liberation of Kuwait in 1990-91, followed by 11 years of contract training and mentoring in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. He is the author of the Heart of a Marine book series; www.heartofamarineseries.com