Suppose that a Palestinian state comes into existence. Suppose further that it is democratic, internationally recognized, and sovereign over the West Bank and Gaza.
Which political movement would most likely form its government? On the basis of recent Palestinian political history, Hamas would be a serious contender, perhaps the most likely winner. What would such a government do? If the future resembled the past, it could launch atrocities comparable to Oct. 7, 2023. Israel would then respond militarily, potentially destroying the new Palestinian state to a degree far beyond the destruction inflicted on Gaza after the original attack.
This prediction cannot be known with certainty. But political judgments can be based on historical experience. The record of Gaza after Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 offers a warning about what can happen when territorial sovereignty is placed in the hands of an armed movement committed to Israel’s destruction.
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Gaza after withdrawal
In 2005, Israel compelled all of its Jewish citizens to leave Gaza. From 2005 to 2007, a civil war took place between Fatah and Hamas. Hamas eventually won and has ruled Gaza almost continuously ever since.
For most practical purposes, Gaza during this period was a Palestinian state in everything but name. Hamas controlled the territory’s internal government, security services, and political institutions. Israel retained control over certain external matters, including borders, because Hamas and other armed groups were launching rockets and suicide bombings against Israel.
Had Gaza’s leaders acted peacefully, the territory might have developed into a prosperous and open commercial center. It could have become something resembling the Hong Kong of the Middle East: a small, densely populated coastal territory linked to regional and international markets.
Instead, Hamas devoted itself to armed conflict. Gaza became a base for rocket attacks, weapons production, tunnel construction, and the preparation of future assaults against Israel. The territory’s political leadership chose confrontation over institution-building.
The lesson is not that Palestinians are incapable of governing themselves. It is that sovereignty does not automatically produce liberal institutions, economic development, or peace. A government must choose to establish them.
The political record
Hamas’s political program does not resemble that of a liberal democratic party. Its original charter called for Israel’s destruction and framed the conflict in explicitly religious terms. Its 2017 political document modified some of the language but did not abandon armed struggle or its commitment to an Islamic political order.
The Palestinian Authority offers no reassuring alternative. Mahmoud Abbas was elected in January 2005 to a four-year presidential term and has remained in office for more than two decades. The Palestinian legislature has been dissolved, and the PA governs the West Bank without a functioning elected parliament.
The PA’s record demonstrates how quickly formal legal protections can become meaningless. The 2017 Cybercrime Law criminalized online criticism of the leadership. In 2021, PA security forces beat activist Nizar Banat to death after he criticized official corruption. The accused officers have still not been tried.
These facts matter because a future Palestinian state would likely inherit political institutions, security structures, and party organizations from Hamas and Fatah. Creating a new flag and declaring independence would not erase the habits of authoritarian government already embedded in those movements.
Elections are not enough
Supporters of Palestinian statehood often speak as if democracy alone would solve the problem. But elections do not guarantee freedom. A majority can elect leaders who suppress dissent, eliminate opposition, control the press, and use violence against minorities.
A future Palestinian state would require far more than elections. It would need an independent judiciary, a functioning legislature, security forces subject to civilian law, protection for journalists and political opponents, freedom of religion, safeguards for private property, and a peaceful mechanism for transferring power.
It would also have to prevent armed factions from maintaining independent military power. Otherwise, a government could be elected while Hamas or another militia remained strong enough to intimidate opponents and dictate national policy.
Recent polling reinforces the uncertainty. A July 2023 survey found that 57% of Gazans had a positive view of Hamas, while 68% of West Bank Palestinians had a positive view of Fatah. After Oct. 7, a December 2023 PCPSR poll found that 72% regarded Hamas’s decision to launch the attack as correct, and 60% preferred Hamas to control Gaza after the war.
Support later declined. In May 2025, half of respondents still considered Oct. 7 the correct decision. By August 2026, Hamas’s overall partisan support had fallen to 24%, tied with Fatah. That decline is politically significant, but it does not establish a liberal consensus. Many Palestinians may reject both factions without having a clear alternative capable of creating stable democratic institutions.
Israel’s likely response
A Palestinian state that pursued peace and prosperity could develop normal relations with Israel and the wider world. A state that permitted Hamas or similar organizations to maintain military power would present Israel with an existential security problem.
Israel would not reasonably be expected to tolerate a neighboring sovereign government that sponsored attacks against Israeli civilians. The more serious the attack, the more destructive the Israeli response would likely be.
This is not a prediction that every future Palestinian state would attack Israel. It is a warning based on precedent. If Hamas controlled a recognized state, it could have access to diplomatic privileges, international financing, official security forces, and potentially more sophisticated weapons. If it used those resources to prepare attacks, Israel might conclude that destroying the state’s military and governmental infrastructure was necessary for its survival.
The consequences could be catastrophic for Palestinians. A state created in the name of national liberation could be destroyed because its leaders used sovereignty as a platform for war.
The conditions for freedom
The comparison with Israel’s Arab citizens demonstrates that national sovereignty and individual liberty are not the same thing. Israel has political imperfections, but it is rated “free” by Freedom House, while both the West Bank and Gaza are classified as not free.
A successful Palestinian state would therefore have to begin with institutional restraints on Hamas and Fatah. It would have to prevent armed factions from maintaining independent military power, permit criticism of government leaders, conduct regular elections, protect minorities, and establish courts independent of the executive.
Most of all, it would have to abandon the idea that national liberation justifies unlimited force. A state that teaches its citizens that peace is surrender and violence is the only authentic form of resistance will remain trapped in permanent conflict.
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Palestinian statehood may be desirable for many reasons, but statehood alone would not make Palestinians free. Gaza demonstrates that a territory can be governed almost entirely by Palestinians and still be authoritarian, militarized, impoverished, and unsafe.
The proper goal should be a Palestinian political order that protects speech, religion, property, political opposition, minorities, and the rule of law while renouncing terrorism and accepting peaceful coexistence with Israel. Without those conditions, creating a Palestinian state would risk producing not a free country but an authoritarian regime with international recognition — and a new war waiting to happen.
James Delmore is an independent writer. Walter E. Block, Ph.D., is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and professor of economics at Loyola University New Orleans.