President Xi Jinping’s upcoming meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 24 provides a perfect opportunity to kick-start a mutually beneficial strategic reset aimed at forging an enduring modus vivendi between China and the United States. The key would be ensuring that over the next two years, the Chinese footprint within the U.S. and its sphere of influence is di minimis, and likewise the American footprint within China and its sphere of influence is insignificant.
If the meeting is to be more than political theatre, there must be a concrete, deliverable bargain that would be consummated over the next two years.
Trump would announce that, effective Dec. 31, 2028, the U.S. would (1) cease deliveries of military equipment and supplies to Taiwan; (2) close down the office of the American Institute in Taiwan; and (3) no longer consider the Senkaku Islands to be within the scope of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty.
Xi would announce that over the next two years ending Dec. 31, 2028: (1) all companies operating in Venezuela that are ultimately owned or controlled by Chinese enterprises will cease operations (or sell their ownership stakes to non-Chinese entities approved by the appropriate Venezuelan authorities); (2) Chinese entities would purchase energy and agricultural products from entities ultimately owned or controlled by U.S. enterprises in an aggregate amount at least equal to $30 billion (to be paid in the form of official Venezuelan debt held by Chinese entities valued at par and the balance in U.S. currency); and (3) all companies operating in Cuba that are ultimately owned or controlled by Chinese enterprises will cease operations (or sell their ownership stakes to non-Chinese entities approved by appropriate Cuban authorities).
Both Trump and Xi would be acknowledging difficult geostrategic realities.
From the U.S. perspective, Trump would be conceding that Taiwan’s unification with China does not pose a threat to U.S. vital national interests. Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (equidistant between Taiwan and Japan), which is under Tokyo’s administrative control, is claimed by Taiwan, China, and Japan. The U.S. has never taken an official position with respect to the sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands. Trump would be conceding the obvious: the Senkaku Islands are not a U.S. vital national interest.
From China’s perspective, Xi would be conceding that access to Venezuela’s energy resources is not a vital national interest. Cuba, which has no strategically important natural resources, manifestly is not a Chinese vital national interest.
Venezuela and Cuba are U.S. vital national interests. Taiwan and the Senkaku are vital to China’s national interests. The suggested bargain would be mutually beneficial and would pave the way to a modus vivendi.
The Sept. 24 meeting should also lay out a framework for a modus vivendi: (1) a clear understanding of America’s and China’s view of the geographic scope of the respective spheres of influence; (2) parameters for economic decoupling; and (3) an understanding of the geographic scope of respective strategic partners (and their associated spheres of influence) — for example the EU, Russia, Iran; and (4) a better understanding of the geographic scope of neutral zones where American and Chinese companies are likely to compete — for example, countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa. These four topics would be fleshed out over the course of a year and set the agenda for a Trump-Xi summit meeting in September 2027 in Beijing.
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Hopefully, there will be more clarity and better understanding of Washington’s and Beijing’s intentions and vital national interests. For example, the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy are ambiguous with respect to whether Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered to be within the U.S. sphere of influence and represent vital national interests. Likewise, if the objective of the U.S. war on Iran is to ensure the country falls within America’s sphere of influence, understanding Beijing’s view of such a development will be important. The Middle Kingdom’s intentions to establish its maritime borders (such as the South China Sea) and land borders (such as its boundary disputes with India) will also influence the contours of a modus vivendi.
It would be a Trump-Xi 2027 summit meeting in Beijing that would finalize the framework for an enduring Sino-American modus vivendi, transforming the strategic paradigm from mutual assured destruction to mutual assured survival.
Samir Tata is the founder and president of International Political Risk Analytics, an advisory firm based in Reston, Virginia, and author of the book Reflections on Grand Strategy: The Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century.