For years, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has been maligned in Europe as Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s man in the Balkans. There is only one problem with this portrayal: reality keeps getting in the way.
Last week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made his first visit to Serbia. Ukraine’s president came to Belgrade to discuss economic cooperation, European integration, energy, and security — and left after lavishing effusive praise on his host. To say that what transpired was historic doesn’t quite convey its significance. Russia, which has traditionally been Serbia’s protector and is venerated by many Serbs, watched helplessly. The Eurocrats who have long accused Vucic of being the Kremlin’s stooge will now have to contrive fresh excuses for obstructing Serbia’s path to full membership of the European Union.
Serbia’s position since Russia’s invasion of its neighbor has always been more nuanced than its critics care to admit. Belgrade has declined to impose sanctions on Russia, but it has also condemned the war, repeatedly affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and permitted its weapons to make their way to Ukrainian armories. Last year, Russia’s foreign intelligence service publicly lashed out at Belgrade for arming Ukraine. In spite of this, the “Kremlin puppet” narrative has persisted.
There is another fact that deserves greater recognition in Europe: Vucic has presided over a profound economic transformation of Serbia.
When he came to power over a decade ago, Serbia was emerging from years of stagnation, with unemployment at almost 26%. By 2024, unemployment had dropped to 8.6%. Serbia has attracted record levels of foreign investment, built an increasingly diversified industrial base, and emerged as an important export hub in the region. The fiscal position has been transformed as well: Public debt, which reached 68.3% of gross domestic product in 2015, had fallen to 45% by 2025.
These are not cosmetic changes. They have altered Serbia’s position in the region and its relationship with the rest of the continent. The World Bank now ranks Serbia as the largest economy in the Western Balkans, stating that it has achieved “remarkable macroeconomic stability”.
Success in the face of hostility from Brussels has not caused Serbia to turn its back on Europe. Quite the opposite. It has pursued aggressive defense deals with France, whose leadership views Belgrade as the linchpin of regional security.
Serbia is faulted for maintaining substantial ties with China and other global powers. But the driver here is not ideology. It is the survival instinct of a medium-sized European state seeking room for maneuver in a changing international system. Europe should understand this distinction.
Lest we forget, the EU maintains close partnerships with a range of countries that have also chosen not to align with its sanctions on Russia or fully mirror Western foreign policy positions. Turkey, for example, remains a NATO member and an EU candidate country despite its independent foreign policy. India is a major strategic partner of the EU, while Brazil and South Africa are key players in the “global south.” In none of these cases has nonalignment precluded the deepening of political or economic cooperation.
What truly galls some of Vucic’s critics in Europe more is not his alleged affinity for China or Russia, but his unabashed fondness for the United States and Israel. He has been one of Europe’s most openly supportive leaders of President Donald Trump and an unapologetic friend to Israel.
Europe should, for its own sake, drop its preoccupation with whether Serbia agrees with all its positions. It does not, and probably never will. Nor should the EU abandon its standards on the rule of law, democratic institutions, or the normal requirements of accession. Those are legitimate subjects for negotiation.
The question Europe ought to ask urgently is whether its interests are advanced by keeping Serbia at arm’s length. In July, eight EU member states opposed opening the next accession cluster with Serbia — jargon for the incremental process by which countries are admitted into the group — despite the European Commission’s recommendation to proceed. Ostracizing Serbia may make certain European leaders feel good, especially as their diminishing status is put on display daily by Trump’s refusal to accord them special treatment, but it is a huge mistake.
The Western Balkans are not peripheral to Europe’s security. Serbia is the largest country in the region outside the EU, sits at the crossroads of important transport and energy routes, has a substantial industrial and defense sector, and wields considerable political influence across the Balkans. Simply put, European interests are better served by having Serbia deeply embedded in European institutions than by encouraging Belgrade to look elsewhere.
The same principle applies to security. Europe wants to dramatically expand its defense industrial capacity. Serbia has demonstrated it can produce significant quantities of munitions for international markets. European countries would evidently benefit from greater cooperation with such an industrial base.
Serbia is not locked into anyone else’s geopolitical orbit. Its leadership is simply practicing a sophisticated, 21st-century version of the nonaligned posture that dates back to the Yugoslav era. Such independence, far from being a threat to Europe, can — if properly handled — be an opportunity. Of course, Serbia should not be rewarded for ignoring European standards. But neither should it be singled out for refusing to surrender its foreign policy, which is its sovereign prerogative.
RUSSIA DIDN’T NEED AN INVASION TO TAKE MY COUNTRY. IS TRUMP PAYING ATTENTION?
Endless humiliation of Belgrade carries the risk of a permanent rupture. To save this relationship, Brussels should make European integration more credible, not less. The objective should be to use engagement to increase European influence, encourage reform, and strengthen Serbia’s stake in the continent’s security and prosperity.
Zelensky’s visit to Serbia not only shatters the caricature of Vucic as a Russian stooge. It also, more importantly, clarifies the urgent choice before Europe. It can continue to treat Serbia’s independent foreign policy as a problem. Or it can treat that autonomy as a potential asset and make it work in Europe’s favour. The wiser course seems obvious to everyone — everyone except a handful of hierarchs in Brussels.
Michael Mosbacher, founder of the British magazines Standpoint and the Critic, is an editor at the Telegraph.