Cook County Circuit Judge Cynthia Ramirez posted two words about a federal law enforcement agency on social media:
“F*** ICE.”
Ramirez is a sitting judge. Yet, as of this writing, the Illinois bar associations that demanded Judge James R. Brown’s removal over political commentary he wrote while retired have expressed no comparable public concern.
Illinois offers a warning of what happens when judicial ethics rules become instruments for policing viewpoints rather than conduct.
Brown, a retired Cook County Circuit Court judge with nearly two decades of service, wrote a political opinion column before returning to the bench. The column was public when the Illinois Supreme Court appointed him to a temporary judicial assignment.
He began hearing cases. There was no finding that he had failed to follow the law, no disciplinary proceeding establishing bias or misconduct, and no hearing at which he could answer his critics.
Then two bar associations objected. They claimed his column, though written in retirement, “ran afoul” of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct and showed that he lacked the impartiality and temperament to serve.
The Illinois Supreme Court removed him through a one-sentence order — no notice, no hearing, and no due process. It later cited Rule 1.2, which requires judges to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.
If Rule 1.2 required Judge Brown’s immediate removal, how does a sitting judge’s profane denunciation of a federal law-enforcement agency promote public confidence in her independence, temperament, and impartiality?
The distinction cannot be explained by the timing of the speech. Brown wrote while retired, before returning to judicial service. Ramirez posted while serving as a judge. Either public confidence and the appearance of impartiality matter consistently, or they do not.
The more troubling explanation is that Illinois enforces not a neutral standard for judicial speech, but a political one. Speech that offends the state’s legal establishment is treated as a crisis. Speech reflecting views the establishment is more willing to tolerate is ignored or excused.
That is not judicial ethics. It is selective enforcement.
Brown’s federal lawsuit has exposed how irregular his removal was. The federal court declined to reinstate him immediately but refused to dismiss his case. It held that he had viable First Amendment and due-process claims and was likely to succeed on his procedural due-process claim if the case proceeds.
Brown had been appointed to a fixed-term assignment with a fixed salary and was removed without notice or a hearing. Illinois’ Constitution provides a formal disciplinary process, including investigation, notice, and a public hearing. He received none of it.
The federal court nevertheless stayed the case so Illinois courts could first address who may remove an assigned judge and what process is required. It summarized the situation in one remarkable sentence:
“Thorny and unprecedented questions of Illinois state law abound.”
That is a polite judicial way of saying: This is a mess.
It is also a fitting description of Illinois government.
Brown has now appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that a federal court cannot send him into a state system controlled by the justices whose actions he challenges. Any state case could ultimately return to the Illinois Supreme Court, where the defendants would be asked to judge their own conduct.
The Ramirez episode tests the principles invoked against Brown. Will the bar associations apply the same standard to her? Will they say her statement undermines the appearance of impartiality? Will they ask the Illinois Supreme Court to act?
Ramirez should not be removed by fiat. She deserves notice and an opportunity to respond — the protections Brown was denied.
But the bar associations should explain why Brown’s political commentary as a private citizen supposedly threatened judicial integrity while a sitting judge’s profane attack on federal law enforcement has produced silence.
The issue is not whether one agrees with Brown about politics or Ramirez about immigration enforcement. Judges have opinions, and one controversial statement does not necessarily prove an inability to apply the law fairly.
The issue is whether Illinois applies the same rules to everyone.
If Ramirez’s statement is protected expression that does not establish bias, Brown deserved the same presumption — and certainly notice and a hearing before losing his assignment. If it warrants scrutiny, the silence surrounding it exposes a political double standard.
Free speech cannot mean that public servants are protected only when their opinions please those controlling their appointments. Due process cannot mean patience for favored officials but a one-sentence order for disfavored ones.
KAGAN’S CLIMATE CONFLICT IS OBVIOUS — RECUSAL SHOULDN’T BE OPTIONAL
Brown deserved a neutral standard applied without regard to viewpoint. Ramirez deserves the same.
The question is whether Illinois is willing to apply the same rules to both sides.
Sara Albrecht is the chairman and CEO of the Liberty Justice Center, which represented the small businesses that successfully challenged the executive’s unlawful emergency tariffs before the Supreme Court.