As Poland marks its National Day of Remembrance for the Victims of the Volhynia Massacre on July 11, history and politics have once again moved to the forefront of Polish-Ukrainian relations.
Poland and Ukraine have forged one of Europe’s most consequential strategic partnerships since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, but their latest dispute over historical memory is a reminder that unresolved wounds from the past can still undermine today’s security. At a moment when Kyiv is advancing toward EU accession and relying on Poland to help fend off Russian aggression, such divisions amount to a geopolitical gift for Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The latest tensions were triggered by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s decision in May to grant a Ukrainian military unit the honorary designation “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army,” or UPA. The UPA fought for an independent Ukrainian state during and after World War II and is widely viewed in Ukraine as a symbol of resistance to Soviet rule. In Poland, however, the group is chiefly remembered as the perpetrators of the 1943-45 Volhynia massacres, in which tens of thousands of Polish civilians were killed.
Although the massacre has long been a sore spot in Polish-Ukrainian relations, Zelensky’s decision prompted an unusually sharp response from Warsaw. President Karol Nawrocki announced that he would revoke the Order of the White Eagle previously awarded to Zelensky, arguing that honoring the UPA “undermines the trust built up over the years.” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has urged de-escalation. But this issue, coming at a time when many Poles have soured on Ukraine, is political gold for Nawrocki and his right-wing Law and Justice party ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections.
Kyiv, too, doubled down. Zelensky made a spectacle of returning his Order of the White Eagle award. He then struck a combative tone when announcing plans for a National Pantheon that will honor prominent Ukrainian historical figures, including other controversial nationalists.
This dispute matters because Poland is integral to Ukraine’s future, and vice versa. One of NATO’s key front-line states, Poland remains Ukraine’s principal transit route for Western military assistance, a logistics and repair hub, and a center for military training. The country currently hosts almost 1 million Ukrainian refugees who fled after Russia’s invasion. And for Poland and other NATO members, a strong, independent Ukraine is a defense against future Russian aggression.
The tensions between Polish and Ukrainian officials threaten to do needless damage to that partnership. The hostile rhetoric seems to have stalled a proposed deal to trade Polish MiG-29 fighter jets for Ukrainian drone technology. Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has even threatened to block Ukraine’s accession to the European Union if Kyiv continues to honor controversial nationalists.
Ukraine’s EU accession is ultimately as much a political process as a technical one. While Ukrainian reforms remain key to achieving membership in the bloc, every major stage in the accession process requires unanimous approval from all member states. Ukraine has already experienced how a single government can slow that process, as Hungary’s Viktor Orban delayed the opening of accession negotiations for nearly two years.
Unsurprisingly, Moscow was quick to pounce. Russian officials gleefully egged on the Poles while reiterating the bogus claim that Ukraine is run by a “neo-Nazi regime.” Ahead of Poland’s July 11 day of remembrance, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) sought to fan the flames by releasing “declassified” archival documents on UPA commander Dmytro Klyachkivsky. This is hardly surprising given that Moscow has repeatedly sought to exploit historical disputes between Poland and Ukraine to undermine support for Kyiv.
History will remain a sensitive issue between Poland and Ukraine. Neither side is likely to abandon its national narrative, nor should difficult historical questions simply be ignored.
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Recent diplomacy nevertheless offers cautious grounds for optimism. Following a July 8 meeting on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Turkey, Nawrocki reaffirmed Poland’s objections to honoring the UPA. But emphasized that this “does not exclude our dialogue,” as both countries face a “common threat” from Russia — a sentiment also expressed by Zelensky.
This dispute can benefit only Russia. Officials both in Warsaw and Kyiv must find ways to de-escalate. They cannot afford to let the past undermine the partnership their shared future depends on.
Dr. Ivana Stradner serves as a research fellow at the FDD’s Barish Center for Media Integrity. Maksym Panchokha is a research intern at the FDD’s Russia program.