As President Donald Trump arrives in Ankara for the NATO summit, Turkey is once again presenting itself as an indispensable ally deserving of Washington’s trust. The timing is no accident. Reports that the administration may ease sanctions, reopen defense cooperation, and explore a path for Turkey’s return to advanced U.S. weapons programs have created new optimism in Ankara.
Washington should be careful. Turkey is not Iran. But in too many of the region’s most important crises, Ankara has pursued policies that undermine U.S. interests while still expecting to be treated as a trusted ally.
That contradiction should no longer be ignored.
Turkey remains an important NATO member. It has the alliance’s second-largest military and sits at one of the world’s most strategic crossroads, between Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. But geography is not the same as reliability. A country can be strategically located and still be strategically untrustworthy.
Over the past decade, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly shown that Turkey’s foreign policy is driven less by alliance loyalty than by transactional advantage. When cooperation with Washington serves Ankara’s interests, Erdogan offers it. When confrontation serves his interests, he chooses that instead.
The clearest example remains Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. This was not a small disagreement between allies. It was a deliberate decision to acquire sensitive Russian military technology while Turkey was still a participant in the F-35 program. The move raised serious concerns about NATO interoperability and the security of America’s most advanced fighter aircraft.
That decision led Congress and two administrations to remove Turkey from the F-35 program and impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Those consequences were not symbolic. They reflected a hard reality: Washington could no longer assume Ankara would protect U.S. technology or prioritize alliance security over Erdogan’s political calculations.
Now Turkey is reportedly signaling that it may relocate, deactivate, or otherwise limit the S-400 system as part of a broader effort to normalize relations with Washington.
That should not be enough.
Moving hardware does not erase the strategic choice that brought it into Turkey in the first place. Nor does it answer the larger question facing American policymakers: Can the United States trust a government that has repeatedly balanced between Washington and Moscow whenever doing so benefits Erdogan?
The record says no.
Turkey has maintained working relationships with Russia even as Moscow has confronted the West. It has clashed with Greece and Cyprus, both key U.S. partners in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has adopted increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Israel. It has pursued military and political policies across Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Caucasus that often complicate American objectives and unsettle U.S. partners.
Again, Turkey is not Iran. But the comparison exposes Washington’s inconsistency. When Iran acts against U.S. interests, Washington responds with sanctions, pressure, and deterrence. When Erdogan’s Turkey takes steps that also damage U.S. interests, too many policymakers still argue that Ankara must be rewarded because it is a NATO ally.
That is not strategy. It is habit.
Alliances cannot be based on geography alone. They require trust, consistency, and shared strategic purpose. Turkey has too often treated NATO membership as a shield while pursuing policies that weaken alliance cohesion from within.
The United States should continue to engage Turkey. Ankara matters in the Black Sea, counterterrorism, migration, energy routes, and regional security. NATO is stronger when Turkey behaves like a reliable ally. But engagement should not mean automatic forgiveness, and it should not require Washington to ignore years of strategic behavior.
The issue is not whether America should talk to Turkey. It should. The issue is whether Turkey should regain access to America’s most advanced defense technology without proving that its policy has fundamentally changed.
It should not.
Providing fifth-generation aircraft or sensitive military systems requires more than temporary diplomacy. It requires confidence that an ally shares America’s long-term security interests and will protect U.S. technology from adversaries. That confidence cannot be restored through a summit, a promise, or a tactical gesture designed to win favor in Washington.
Congress understood this when it supported removing Turkey from the F-35 program. The reasons behind that decision remain largely unchanged.
Trump is right to seek stronger alliances and greater burden-sharing within NATO. But stronger alliances are not built by rewarding governments that undermine American policy and then return to Washington asking for privileges. They are built by demanding accountability from allies as well as adversaries.
Erdogan has repeatedly adjusted his tone when relations with Washington deteriorated, only to return to policies that challenge U.S. interests once pressure fades. That pattern should guide American policy today.
Washington should judge Ankara by sustained behavior, not summit choreography. Any restoration of defense privileges should require lasting, verifiable changes in Turkish policy, especially regarding Russia, NATO interoperability, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and the protection of U.S. defense technology.
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Turkey can still be an important ally. But trust must be earned. It cannot be granted because Erdogan smiles at the right moment or says the right words during a NATO summit.
Congress should remember why Turkey lost these privileges in the first place. The United States should not reward another tactical charm offensive from Ankara.
Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, Middle East security, Iraqi politics, and regional affairs. His analysis and commentary have appeared in major U.S., Middle Eastern, and international news outlets.