As we approach the 2026 NATO Summit, the alliance’s eastward shift in its center of gravity continues to gain momentum.
Last week, reports emerged that the United States is now in the early stages of internal conversations within NATO to expand nuclear sharing arrangements to include countries that joined the alliance within the past 30 years, such as Lithuania and Poland.
While the U.S. forward deploys tactical nuclear weapons to bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, these conversations do not, for now, relate to opening new weapons depots, but rather to basing dual-capable aircraft — those able to deliver conventional or nuclear ordnance — further east.
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Under nuclear sharing arrangements, some member states voluntarily contribute dual-capable aircraft, such as the F-35, F-16, or Tornado, which are modified and certified to carry U.S. tactical nuclear bombs in future scenarios, while personnel from those countries are trained for the mission.
The latter contribution is reportedly what is currently under discussion. Poland is procuring 32 F-35 aircraft, and the conversation with Lithuania appears tied to hosting American — or, considering their close ties, in the future German — dual-capable aircraft in the country.
Last week, Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas stated deployments during peacetime were not under consideration, but that “in times of crisis or, let us say, even during war, we should probably utilise all possible opportunities provided to us by NATO and the nuclear arsenals of the United States or France.”
The timing of the reports is instructive, coming on the heels of the U.S. cancellation of a 4,000-strong rotational force to Eastern Europe, which has left allies feeling anxious.
Lithuania, which has invested heavily in recent years to upgrade bases and training grounds for hosting U.S. soldiers, saw a contingent of 1,000 rotational troops from the U.S. depart last week without a clear replacement, the first time a gap between rotations has occurred since 2020.
Lithuanian officials have received assurances from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that a new U.S. rotation will eventually arrive, but the size and timing of the deployment remain opaque.
Any decision to remove American forces from the continent or cut rotations is likely to entail a financial cost to the U.S., whereas many host nations in Europe already heavily subsidize the presence. Some have even expressed a willingness to cover the entire cost of basing U.S. forces.
For American allies that feel the threat from Russia most acutely, the presence of U.S. servicemembers on their soil serves as an outsize deterrent that cannot be easily replaced.
While any conversations around expanding nuclear sharing arrangements with a new cadre of alliance member states is today still a nascent idea, the public airing of this possibility is meant to send a message to the Kremlin at a time when the Pentagon appears intent on shrinking its conventional posture in Europe.
Last month, the U.S. announced, with immediate effect, substantial cuts to forces earmarked to reinforce Europe in the event of future conflict. While these changes are for the time being largely an exercise on paper, their importance for NATO deterrence should not be understated.
Signaling a strict limit on American support to allies in a future NATO war against Russia is not without considerable risk.
While the Trump administration sees a paring back of U.S. conventional posture in Europe as a forcing function for allies to rebuild capabilities quickly and at scale, the delta before European NATO can backfill the recently announced U.S. reductions will be traversed over years rather than weeks.
Regardless, heading into Ankara, the fact that expanding nuclear sharing is under discussion underscores how the accumulation of strength in eastern Europe has caught Washington’s attention and is actively transforming the alliance.
Last year, NATO members with land borders with Russia spent an average of 3.61% of GDP on defense, compared with 2.49% across the broader alliance.
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Already leading the pack on spending, these allies continue to charge ahead. This year, Estonia and Lithuania will spend 5.4% of GDP on defense, leading the sprint on investment, with Latvia (4.91%) and Poland (4.48%) not far behind.
Yet even as Eastern European allies shoulder a growing share of the defense burden, their interest in deeper nuclear cooperation with NATO underscores a reality that remains unchanged: no European capability can fully substitute for the deterrent value of a visible and sustained American military presence on the continent.
Daniel Kochis is a senior fellow in the Center on Europe and Eurasia at the Hudson Institute.