A real strategy for dismantling militias in Iraq

.

The United States has made clear demands of Iraq regarding Iran-backed militias and attacks on American interests. But demands without a sustainable strategy are ineffective. They give the Iraqi government and Tehran the ambiguity they need to offer vague promises, evasive statements, and ultimately no meaningful action.

If Washington is serious about restoring deterrence and protecting U.S. personnel, it must move beyond rhetoric and adopt an enforceable strategy that corners Baghdad into a credible plan.

That strategy should rest on four pillars.

1. Publicly identify and isolate the militia leadership

The U.S. should publicly name the senior militia leaders responsible for attacks, intimidation, and the erosion of Iraqi sovereignty. These figures include Qais Khazali of Asa’ib Ahl Haq, Akram Kaabi of Harakat al-Nujaba, Abu Alaa Walai, and Abu Fadak Muhammadawi, among others.

Some of these individuals are not merely armed commanders. They are also influential actors within Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework, the political bloc that plays a decisive role in selecting Iraq’s prime minister. In other words, individuals linked to violence sit inside the very power structure that governs the country.

This contradiction should no longer be tolerated. These militia leaders must be removed from Iraq’s political and security decision-making circles and held accountable through sanctions, travel restrictions, diplomatic isolation, and termination.

2. Confront the PMF structure itself

All of these Iran-backed militias operate under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which provides legal cover, political legitimacy, and state funding. While the PMF is presented as an Iraqi state institution, many of its most powerful factions answer less to Baghdad than to the Iranian Commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, and Iran’s regional command structure.

Washington must make clear that Iraq cannot preserve sovereignty while maintaining a parallel armed system.

There are also constitutional grounds within Iraq itself for dismantling or restructuring the PMF. Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits militias operating outside the framework of the armed forces. 

Regrettably, some career diplomats, remnants of the Biden-Obama Iran appeasement era, continue to echo the Iraqi government’s false narrative that because the PMF was created through parliamentary legislation, it should be treated as merely an internal Iraqi matter. Some of these same voices are now in Washington think tanks, where they continue to promote the same misleading argument.

That argument fails on its own legal terms. Under Article 13 of the constitution, any law that contradicts the constitution is invalid. No statute can legitimize armed formations that supersede the state and answer to foreign influence.

3. Use financial pressure against militia funding

Unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is funded directly by Iran, Iraq’s militias are financed largely through Iraqi oil revenues routed through the state budget. Billions of dollars have reportedly been allocated through PMF budget lines, including salary payments alone.

This creates leverage.

The U.S. should use sanctions, banking restrictions, and access to dollar-clearing systems to pressure Baghdad unless funding to militia factions is halted. No sovereign government should be permitted to use public revenues to finance armed groups that threaten diplomats, undermine institutions, and destabilize the region. The recent move by Washington to restrict dollar transfers to Iraq from Iraq’s oil funds held at the Federal Reserve is a step in the right direction.

The Iraqi government also grants these groups identification cards, vehicles, and official license plates through the PMF framework. That enables them to move through Baghdad’s Green Zone and intimidate both Iraqi institutions and the U.S. Embassy.

4. Hold enablers inside the Iraqi state accountable

Pressure should not stop with militia commanders. It should extend to Iraqi judicial, political, and military officials who shield these groups from accountability.

Iraq’s courts have failed to seriously prosecute senior militia figures despite repeated public threats and open incitement broadcast on television and social media. Likewise, security officials accused of obstructing action against militias should face direct consequences.

If parts of the Iraqi state are collaborating with armed factions against the interests of Iraq itself, they should not be treated as neutral partners.

A policy of demands alone will fail

For too long, Washington has relied on statements without consequences. That approach invites delay, deception, and continued attacks.

AMERICA IS ABOUT TO HAND IRAQ TO IRAN AGAIN

If the U.S. wants results in Iraq, it must pair its demands with enforcement: Name perpetrators, dismantle the PMF system, cut funding streams, and sanction those who protect militia impunity.

Without strategy, demands are noise. With strategy, they become leverage.

Entifadh Qanbar is a doctoral candidate in statecraft and strategy at the Institute of World Politics and former spokesman for the deputy prime minister of Iraq.

Related Content