Days prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Iran, the Pentagon evacuated most personnel from the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Their exit came after a quarter-century presence that began after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. Qatar’s willingness to invest billions of dollars in the base to host Americans led the Pentagon within just a few years to transfer most of its forces from Saudi Arabia into Qatar. For Doha, the price was worth it. Not only did the presence of the Americans bring prestige, but Qatar also used the American presence as a get-out-of-jail-free card to escape accountability for its cultivation of extremist and terrorist groups across the region.
Across administrations, the Pentagon embraced such basing offers, often putting its own bureaucratic interests above broader U.S. national security. Successive defense secretaries would embrace a base, especially one for whose lease they need not pay, without consideration of the host country’s motivation. They would then counsel against responding to that country’s provocations, lest the ability to use a “free” base be put in jeopardy.
Qatar was not the only country that leveraged a U.S. base for immunity. In the late 20th century, Saudi authorities hosted American forces as Saudi officials simultaneously plotted with al Qaeda to kill Americans. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan transformed Turkey into a state sponsor of terrorism, supporting groups ranging from Hamas and Hezbollah to al Qaeda and the Islamic State, all while the Pentagon and State Department run interference for fear of losing access to the Incirlik Air Base.
Across the Middle East, however, basing has proved more of a liability than an asset. Prior to its June 2025 and March 2026 conflicts with Iran, the U.S. evacuated most personnel from its bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Iraq. No matter how many Patriot missile systems the U.S. deploys, U.S. troops stationed so close to the front will be vulnerable to ballistic missiles and drones.
Even when the vulnerability of personnel is not the problem, basing in the Middle East and Turkey gives host countries a de facto veto over missions. When the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda attacks, Oman refused to allow the U.S. Air Force to run missions from its airfield. Even after Muscat reversed course, it would often tip off the Taliban of the impending attack. Turkey rejected operations through Incirlik during the 2003 Iraq War and, more recently, both Turkey and Qatar forbade U.S. operations against Iran.
When the Iran war finally ends, the Pentagon should reassess basing throughout the region. While naval facilities in Manama and Jebel Ali will remain crucial — and while Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are responsible hosts — maintaining other bases may do more harm than good. Rather than defer to Turkey, the U.S. should rely on Greece and Cyprus. Rather than remain in Saudi Arabia and Oman, the U.S. should expand in Somaliland.
HOW IRAN HAS CHANGED FROM THE START OF THE WAR UNTIL THE CEASEFIRE
Nor does there need to be a one-to-one trade in bases. The U.S. military moved into the Persian Gulf in 1971, as the British evacuated its bases due to a contraction in its strategic vision and willingness to project power. It is now time for the U.S. to do likewise, albeit without forfeiting power projection. U.S. aircraft today have greater range, and amphibious assault vessels transporting F-35s and Ospreys render many bases obsolete.
The Pentagon basing map must reflect 21st-century realities, not 20th-century legacies. National interest requires bases to serve clear objectives and neither come saddled with caveats nor constrain diplomatic action when host countries go bad.
Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.