In 2019, the then-Sen. Marco Rubio co-wrote an open letter to President Donald Trump, warning him about “the steady erosion of freedom, the rule of law and quality of governance” in Viktor Orban’s Hungary and pointed to Budapest’s strategic alignment with Moscow.
In a striking about-face, Rubio traveled to Budapest this week, this time as secretary of state, and offered Orban a public endorsement ahead of a high-stakes election this spring. What is more, on his way from the Munich Security Conference to Hungary, Rubio made a stop in Bratislava to meet with the leadership of Slovakia, a country committed to a “foreign policy of all azimuths” — a strategic approach aimed at fostering relations in all directions.
From the perspective of U.S. interests in Europe, these selections are troubling. True, both countries are purchasing U.S. weapons systems and are seeking other economic ties. Hungary has placed an order for a high-mobility artillery rocket system worth about $700 million, and the Slovak government is considering purchasing four additional F-16 fighters, on top of its current order of 14. Incidentally, Hungary’s HIMARS deal was long on hold because of bipartisan concerns, best articulated by Sen. Jim Risch (R-ID), about the nature of Orban’s regime and its misguided foreign policy priorities.
Slovakia is also moving ahead in its negotiations with Westinghouse to build a nuclear reactor in Mochovce — while Hungary has contracted the same company to supply fuel to its new, Russian-built plant in Paks.
However, what seems to have played a bigger role in the selection of European capitals to visit, unfortunately, was the superficial ideological alignment between the Trump administration and the governments of Orban and the Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico. Orban in particular has captured conservative imaginations in America in ways vastly out of proportion to his actual policy achievements. If Hungary seems to have mass migration under control, it is likely because very few people are keen to immigrate to what has become the European Union’s poorest economy.
Fico did stick to Make America Great Again-friendly talking points in his appearances at the Conservative Political Action Conference last year, but he is also a Soviet nostalgist with little genuine affection for the United States. The very day of Fico’s visit with Trump at Mar-a-Lago in January, an influential Member of European Parliament from his party, Lubos Blaha, led a protest against “U.S. imperialism” and in support of Venezuela.
The idea that Hungary and Slovakia, especially under their current governments, should be privileged interlocutors or models for others to follow is laughable. Their size and relative influence aside, the leaders of both countries see the world through lenses that rarely prioritize the trans-Atlantic partnership over other, more transactional ties.
For example, while Germany has received a lot of flak from Trump over its dependence on Russian natural gas, its successive governments have made impressive strides to remedy the situation after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine — lowering the share of Russian gas imports from 52% of the total to single digits in just two years. Budapest and Bratislava did no such thing.
Hungary has other options, including increased imports of U.S. liquefied natural gas via regional interconnectors and Croatian terminals, promoted over the years by both the Biden and Trump administrations. However, it continues to import close to 90% of its natural gas from Russia, relying on new pipelines such as TurkStream. Together, Slovaks and Hungarians have sought to derail the EU’s looming ban on Russian fossil fuels, and they are even challenging it in court.
Hungary has stood firm on its imports of Russian crude oil in the wake of the full-scale invasion, which now account for 92% of total oil imports, compared to just 61% in 2021. This week, Hungary and Slovakia announced plans to cut diesel export supplies to Kyiv if Ukraine does not reopen the Druzhba pipeline, which brings Russian oil to Slovakia and Hungary. Under agreements signed with Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom, Hungary is expanding the Paks Nuclear Power Plant — the “Paks II” project — largely financed by a Russian loan.
While Fico and Orban want to rationalize their choices as reflecting the small size and landlocked nature of their countries, such explanations do not hold water in a world of massive investment into gas and energy interconnectors across Europe. If countries that were more vulnerable to Russian blackmail, such as Bulgaria, were able to diversify away from Russian sources of energy, so can Slovakia and Hungary.
Orban’s energy alignment with Moscow trails Hungary’s broader “Eastern Opening,” launched as part of the country’s foreign policy doctrine after 2010. That has also included an energetic outreach to Beijing, elevating bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership that explicitly links Hungary’s foreign policy with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In joint statements, both governments have committed to deepening cooperation and to strengthening the BRI and Hungary’s economic outreach to Asia. This framework has facilitated infrastructure projects, including the Budapest-Belgrade railway, and expanded cooperation in clean energy and innovation, reflecting a broader political willingness in Budapest to position China as a central strategic partner.
China is one of Hungary’s most important non-European partners, driving substantial Chinese foreign direct investment and industrial projects. Hungary alone accounted for a large share of Chinese investment in Europe in recent years, particularly in electric vehicle production, battery plants, and new energy technologies. These investments bolstered economic ties and aligned with broader political narratives in Budapest that emphasize strategic autonomy from EU and U.S. pressure. Chinese firms continue to deepen their footprint in Hungary’s industrial and energy landscape, even as Brussels expresses concern over competition and subsidies.
THE US HOCKEY TEAM KNELT — AND THAT’S WHAT MATTERS
While operating at a much lower level of sophistication, Fico has pursued a similar route in his country’s relations with Beijing, now elevated to “a strategic partnership.” During a visit to China, Fico and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to expand bilateral cooperation across trade, investment, and infrastructure, especially in new energy, transport, and logistics. These sectors are linked to broader Chinese global economic outreach and the BRI framework. For Slovakia, they offer the prospect of Chinese investment, especially in the EV sector.
A rational U.S. response would involve putting pressure on allies that seek to cozy up to Moscow and Beijing despite being NATO members. Fico and Orban should have to choose. They can’t have their cake and eat it too. They can’t continue to enjoy America’s security guarantees, investments, and weapons systems while also courting Washington’s adversaries to extract concessions from them too. Given their size, applying such pressure, thoughtfully and strategically, should be very easy — assuming, of course, that the U.S. administration in question is interested in maintaining ally unity and cohesion. Alas, it seems all too often that the current one is animated more by parochial, culture-war-like impulses than by deeper strategic considerations.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Ivana Stradner is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.