How Ukraine won the battle for Kyiv

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At 4:15 a.m. on Feb. 24, 2022, explosions jolted Kyiv awake. Russia had launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine from Belarus in the north, from Russia in the east, and from occupied Crimea in the south. The capital of Kyiv was the primary target.

Moscow’s plan was to seize Kyiv within three days, kill Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and install a government loyal to the Kremlin. The Kremlin expected Zelensky to flee or quickly die, his government to collapse, and Ukrainians to offer little resistance. Some Russian units were reportedly issued dress uniforms in anticipation of a victory parade on Kyiv’s central Khreshchatyk Street.

None of that happened.

Ukraine’s military had spent the preceding weeks silently repositioning weapons and personnel away from likely strike targets. The initial Russian air campaign, designed to destroy Ukrainian air defenses and sever military communications, failed. Russian ground forces pressed forward without control of the sky above. It was a failure from which Moscow never recovered.

The ground assault came from three directions: through Chernobyl to the northwest, and from Chernihiv and Sumy to the north and northeast. Many of the Russian soldiers in those columns believed they had been sent to Belarus for routine exercises. They were ordered to join armored formations rolling toward the capital. Among them were units from Russia’s Eastern Military District, widely regarded by military analysts as the least combat-ready formation in the Russian army. Moscow had assigned its weakest forces to its most demanding mission.

Facing approximately 50,000 Russian troops approaching from the north and northwest, Kyiv’s defenders were vastly outnumbered. The city’s regular military component was a single formation, the 72nd Mechanized Brigade. It was supported by National Guard units and a newly activated Territorial Defense Force composed primarily of veterans and civilian volunteers.

A 60-kilometer Russian armored column, estimated to carry around 15,000 troops, was smashed to a stop by Ukraine. In large part, this was down to Javelin anti-tank missiles that then-former President Donald Trump had given Ukraine a few years back, next-generation light anti-tank weapons received from the United Kingdom, and Bayraktar drones from Turkey delivered. Russian vehicles were caught in a killing box and could neither advance nor reverse. What Moscow had projected as a drive of several hours stretched into days, then weeks. Logistics collapsed. Units equipped for three to four days of operations ran short of fuel, food, and ammunition.

The battle for Hostomel airport, northwest of the capital, was another key confrontation. Russia deployed elite airborne units to seize the airfield and use it as a logistics hub and entry point for reinforcements. Ukraine’s 4th Rapid Response Brigade, with roughly 400 soldiers, mounted the initial defense. The airport changed hands repeatedly before Russian forces secured it, but in a condition too damaged to serve any military purpose. Russia’s elite airborne divisions took heavy losses and failed to accomplish their primary objectives.

The decisive moment of Kyiv’s defense, according to Ukraine’s general staff, came at Moshchun, a small village in the forest 20 kilometers from the capital. Fighting lasted a month here. Ukrainian forces blew the Irpin River dam, flooding the surrounding land and blocking Russian armor from crossing. Ukraine then surrounded Moshchun on two sides and began shelling Russian troop concentrations and river crossings until the enemy was pushed back to the Irpin’s left bank. On March 21, Ukrainian forces retook Moshchun entirely.

WHY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS FOCUSED ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

With their northwestern axis broken and their eastern push stalled under similar pressure, Russian forces lost their path into the capital. Their campaign stalled. By late March, Ukraine moved to the offensive, and Moscow announced a withdrawal as a “goodwill”.

But the rape and massacres Russian forces left behind in Bucha told the world what Russia could do if it were to capture Kyiv. This is a war for which Ukraine must continue to receive Western support.

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