“I believe the time has come to bring Europe’s mutual defense clause to life,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared at the 2026 Munich Security Conference. Her words captured the mood in European capitals. As Washington continues its strategic pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and signals that Europe must take primary responsibility for its own defense, calls for a European army have returned with renewed urgency.
The anxiety is understandable. Europe has the population, economic weight, and industrial base to defend itself. Yet the obstacle to a European army is not resources — it is political structure and democratic reality.
Sovereignty and political control
Military force is the ultimate expression of national sovereignty. The authority to deploy soldiers into combat cannot easily be transferred to a supranational institution without fundamentally reshaping the nation-state. For many European Union members, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, this remains a red line.
Any EU defense policy would also be subordinate to EU foreign policy, which is already disjointed and frequently dysfunctional. It is shaped by consensus rules, competing geopolitical priorities, and national caveats. Defense strategy cannot be stronger than the political authority directing it. If foreign policy remains fragmented, defense policy will reflect that fragmentation. An army without unified political direction becomes a bureaucratic compromise rather than a credible instrument of power.
Institutional design and decision-making constraints
The EU was constructed to temper unilateralism and prevent the re-emergence of great-power rivalry within Europe. Its institutional design prioritises negotiation and consensus. That has delivered stability and prosperity. It does not lend itself to rapid crisis response.
War requires clarity of command and speed of decision-making. Under current arrangements, major security decisions often require unanimity or near unanimity. In a crisis involving Russia or instability on Europe’s periphery, divergent national interests would surface immediately. Delay in such moments is strategically costly.
Democratic accountability and political legitimacy
Democratic accountability is perhaps the most underappreciated obstacle. The scale of combat deaths in the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated what high-intensity warfare looks like in Europe. The numbers are far beyond what post-Cold War European electorates are accustomed to absorbing.
No democratic government can sustain heavy battlefield losses without direct accountability to its voters. If decisions to deploy troops are perceived to be made in Brussels by officials who cannot be removed from office through national elections, public consent will erode quickly. Citizens will demand answers from leaders they can directly sanction at the ballot box.
Burden sharing would also become contentious. Every nation would prefer its forces in logistical, intelligence, cyber, or support roles rather than on the front line. In real warfare, someone absorbs the highest casualties. Democratic governments answer to their own electorates first. A supranational command structure would intensify this tension rather than resolve it.
Divergent strategic cultures
Europe does not share a single strategic worldview. France sees itself as an expeditionary military power with global responsibilities. Germany remains historically cautious in the use of force. Poland and the Baltic states prioritize territorial defense against Russia. Southern European states focus more on migration and Mediterranean instability.
These differences are rooted in geography, history, and domestic politics. A unified army requires agreement not only on capabilities but on when force should be used. Europe has not yet achieved that convergence.
NATO’s existing role and capability gap
NATO already provides integrated command structures, interoperability standards, intelligence, logistics, airlift, missile defense, and nuclear deterrence. Much of Europe’s defense effectiveness depends on American enablers within NATO.
A European army would either duplicate these structures at enormous cost or remain dependent on NATO, adding limited strategic value. Without replicating the high-end capabilities currently provided by the United States, Europe would struggle to operate independently at scale.
The Franco-German dynamic
France and Germany are often described as the engine of European integration. France brings operational experience, a strong defense industry, and nuclear capability. Germany brings economic weight and industrial capacity.
Yet both face constraints. Germany’s constitutional framework and domestic political culture limit rapid military integration. France is unlikely to subordinate its strategic autonomy, particularly over its deterrent and overseas operations. Cooperation will deepen, but a fully sovereign European army would require political integration that neither side has embraced.
The veto versus centralisation dilemma
Any European army would confront a structural dilemma. If every member state retains a veto over deployments, paralysis is likely. If decision-making is centralized and majority-based, sovereignty backlash becomes inevitable. Either path risks instability. Defense would amplify existing tensions within the union over how much authority should be pooled at the European level.
IN FOCUS: THE INEVITABLE, UNBEARABLE POLITICIZATION OF THE OLYMPICS
Europe’s security challenge is real. The urgency expressed in Munich reflects genuine concern about the continent’s strategic future. But strategic autonomy cannot be created by institutional declaration alone. It requires unified political authority, shared threat perception, sustained public consent, and clear democratic accountability.
For now, NATO remains the only credible framework for collective European defence. It is the only show in town. Rather than attempting to build a parallel structure that risks fragmentation and dysfunction, Europe should focus on strengthening NATO, deepening its European pillar, and investing seriously in the capabilities that make deterrence real.
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim OBE is the chief strategy officer at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy and author of A Greater Britain: Rethinking the UK’s Global Strategy.