George Orwell was on to it almost 80 years ago — the problem of below-replacement level birth rates. In a short book written for the Britain in Pictures series in 1947, written just as Britain was emerging from wartime rigors into an uncharted postwar future, Orwell noted that despite an upward blip in birth rates during the war, “the general curve is downward. The position is not quite so dangerous as it is sometimes said to be, but can only be put right if the curve not only rises sharply but does so within ten or at most twenty years.”
“Otherwise,” he went on, forebodingly, “the population will not only fall, but, what is worse, will consist predominantly of middle-aged people. If that point is reached, the decline may never be retrievable.” Orwell did not live to see it — he died at the age of 46 in 1950 — but the danger was averted. Postwar birth rates rose in Britain and parts of Europe, though not so robustly as in the United States, where the baby boom peaked in 1957 and petered out after the introduction of the birth control pill in 1962.
The peak U.S. fertility rate, or the projection of how many children the median woman would have if current birth rates continued, hovered above 3.5 and then plunged to 1.74 in the bicentennial year of 1976, just about the same as 2025’s 1.79.
Fertility rates remained low in the 1980s, then rose and occasionally reached the replacement rate of 2.1 in the high-immigration 1990s through the Great Recession of 2007. The latest rate was an uptick from the 1.6 levels of the COVID-19-affected 2020-2024 period, leaving the U.S. with something similar to the dilemma Orwell warned Britons against.
And it’s not just the U.S. Plunging birth rates are a worldwide phenomenon. Europe’s fertility rates have been well below replacement for years, with nations’ under-70 populations set to fall by 20% in the next decade, not only in economically stagnant Britain and France, where births are tilted toward immigrants, but also in rapidly growing, low-immigration Poland.
Birth rates have dropped below replacement rates since 2000 in most of Latin America, largely because of lower-income mothers, such as Hispanic women in the U.S., having fewer children.
China, despite the repeal of its one-child policy in 2015, saw its fertility rate plunge to 0.9 in 2025. If births continued at current numbers, the lowest evidently since the 18th century, China’s population would shrink by more than half, from 1.4 billion to 625 million. Elsewhere in east Asia, the latest birth rates have fallen to 0.8 in Taiwan and Thailand, and even lower in South Korea.
Koreans have shown the determination to maintain their culture, including their alphabet and independence, in a neighborhood with many more Japanese and Chinese. They have risen from abject poverty to become world-class exporters since the 1953 armistice. But they may be at risk of disappearing: at current birth rates, every 100 South Koreans today will have only six great-grandchildren.
What is behind this worldwide trend? At least one thing is clear about what is happening in America — and how it’s different from previous periods. It’s that childbearing has increasingly become a partisan activity.
As the Institute for Family Studies’s Lyman Stone pointed out, American conservatives and progressives each had a fertility rate of 2.7 in 1980, well above replacement level. In the 2020s, conservatives’ fertility rate has dropped marginally to about 2.4, still above replacement level.
But the progressives’ rate has fallen to 1.8, below replacement level, and generally tracks the pattern in economically developed countries.
It’s not difficult to see why. Young women increasingly tilt left politically and also tend to marry less often, hold jobs outside the home, say they don’t want children, and travel more frequently. These behaviors correlate with childlessness or with delaying childbearing, which often results in fewer births than desired.
The gap reflects “systematic differences in family formation between conservatives and liberals,” analyst Zachary Donnini wrote. Before the Great Recession, this was masked by high birth rates among black women who were heavily Democratic. But black (and Hispanic) birth rates fell sharply after 2007.
BIG SURPRISES IN THE 2030 CENSUS ESTIMATES
At the same time, the gap in political and cultural attitudes between young men and women has grown wider, on campus (where young men are increasingly outnumbered) and off, and both marriage and premarital sex rates have declined.
Extrapolate those trends outward, and you see something like the picture revealed in the Census Bureau’s recently released 2026 estimates of states’ populations. They showed two-thirds of the national population increase occurring in safe red 2024 states, 21% in the seven seriously contested purple states, and only 11% in the safe blue states.
Similarly, since children tend to share their parents’ political views, Wall Street Journal contributor Louise Perry wrote, we can “expect the partisan fertility gap to usher in a U.S. that is more conservative. In fact, the whole of the developed world is on track to become more conservative.” That’s a trend that Orwell, a proud socialist, might well have found even more dangerous than it’s sometimes said to be.