Congress must prioritize resilience and reliability in FirstNet reauthorization

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When it comes to public safety, resiliency is paramount in communications, particularly in a time of crisis. In the coming year, Congress has an opportunity to fix a program intended to help first responders communicate more efficiently in emergencies, but in critical moments, it has fallen short.

The First Responder Network Authority was established by Congress in 2012 with a sunset in 2027. Congress now faces a key question set up by that 2012 law: What changes need to be made to ensure that FirstNet reflects the current public safety communications environment? The simple fact is that America’s technological landscape has changed dramatically over time. New technologies, from sophisticated data applications to the burgeoning use of drones by first responders, have transformed how public safety officers save lives. With these new technologies comes a new vulnerability: the risk of a single point of failure.

This challenge is magnified by a foundational dynamic of the program: The “FirstNet network” is entirely owned and operated by a single telecommunications provider, AT&T. Given the magnitude of the scale and complexity of the public safety challenges facing our first responders, consolidating this risk with one provider could result in the network’s failure when police officers, firefighters and other emergency response personnel need it the most to save lives. As we have seen several times in recent years, most recently earlier this month, even the most sophisticated wireless providers can experience service disruptions.

The renewal of FirstNet should not simply be a reaffirmation of the importance of interoperable new generation communications for first responders. That debate has been settled. It must embrace a reality that public safety professionals know all too well: no matter how rugged the network, there is always a risk of failure. This includes A&T’s FirstNet network, as documented by several significant inspector general reports. Congress has a unique opportunity to consider changing technological landscapes and confront a critical question: In an era of increasing technological complexity, do we really want to put all our public safety eggs in one basket? Absolutely not. The threats we face continue to evolve, and the way we approach those threats must, too.

A natural disaster, a large-scale cyberattack, or even a local network outage could sever the capabilities of a single network, turning a lifesaving tool into a useless piece of hardware. We don’t have to wonder about these scenarios; we have evidence of the challenges posed by a single point of failure in AT&T’s FirstNet network.

A Commerce Department inspector general report evaluating the 2023 Maui wildfires found that the “FirstNet Authority did not ensure that timely, adequate [communications] services were provided to support public safety’s response to the wildfires.” As an example, the report noted that AT&T took up to 11 days to restore service at affected cell sites; even then, “issues with connectivity and communication hampered first responders’ ability to provide their services.”

The Nashville Christmas bombing in 2020 provides another instance of FirstNet falling short. The Commerce Department inspector general found that the National Guard requested a deployable for a network outage during the bombing, but it “was defective and it was no longer needed by the time it was repaired.” Notably, the bombing occurred in front of a central building housing AT&T equipment, taking out all customer and public safety services at the same time — further illustrating the inherent risks associated with excessive reliance on a single network provider.

Resilience is now the ultimate measure of preparedness. After the disruptions of the pandemic, supply chains have shifted away from a sole focus on efficiency to a new emphasis on resilience. Major companies no longer rely on a single overseas manufacturer for a critical component, instead opting for “dual-sourcing” or “multi-sourcing” from geographically diverse locations.

The principles of resilience and redundancy must guide the FirstNet reauthorization debate. As the former acting secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, I know how important it is for preparedness policy to move beyond the post-9/11 single-network paradigm and build public safety infrastructure that mirrors the redundancy and resilience we demand of other critical systems.

RESTORING AMERICA: WELL-TRAINED MIND GOES WOKE

FirstNet was created as an investment in the future of public safety communications. As Congress weighs reauthorization, it should consider how that investment can be better utilized to meet the evolving needs of first responders and how it can fully leverage a more reliable and resilient multi-provider ecosystem. Recognizing this evolved mission, first responders would benefit if FirstNet empowered interoperability across various public safety networks rather than focusing solely on one. Congress should also examine the need to expand competition in public safety communications and direct agencies across the federal government to do the same.

Given the vast public safety challenges facing our nation — including natural disasters, terrorist threats, cyber events, lone wolf actors, as well as sophisticated criminal networks — complacency is not an option. We should always be asking how we can meet the emergency response needs of today and working to prevent the threats of tomorrow. Our first responders, and the people they protect, deserve nothing less.

Chad F. Wolf served as acting secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the third-largest federal department in the U.S. government, under President Donald Trump’s first term. He has over 25 years of government and public policy experience, having served in two presidential administrations, on Capitol Hill, and in the private sector. Wolf is now the president and founder of Wolf Global Advisors and currently advises Verizon.

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