The political situation in Venezuela is uncertain. President Donald Trump suggests Venezuela’s new president, Delcy Rodriguez, will cooperate with the United States. Perhaps, perhaps not. But the initiative is clearly with the Trump administration. Dictator President Nicolas Maduro was dancing carefree in Caracas a week ago. Today, thanks to a stunning military operation, Maduro is occupying a New York City prison cell. Maduro’s inner circle must be wondering if they are next.
But the Venezuelan elites aren’t the only ones likely to be sleeping with one eye open. After all, Cuba also now has a big problem. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, “If I lived in Havana, and I was in the government, I’d be concerned, at least a little bit.”
Cuba staked a great deal on its relationship with Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez. In return for deploying medical, technical, and security-intelligence personnel to protect his rule and support associated social programs, Maduro provided Cuba with the oil it needs to keep its creaking power grid in a minimally functional condition. But as U.S. warships continue to affect a general blockade of Venezuela, Cuba can no longer expect those energy supplies to be forthcoming. Renewable energy projects and energy imports from Mexico are grossly inadequate to compensate for this loss.
2026 is unlikely to be easy for President Miguel Díaz-Canel and the real powers behind the throne, Raúl Castro and the Cuban military.
Cuba’s daily energy blackouts last many hours, and goods shortages, including basic foodstuffs and medicines, are already at critical levels. This malaise has provoked escalating, otherwise rare protests over the past two years. Indeed, perhaps 18% of the Cuban population left for the U.S. between 2022 and 2023 alone. The Caribbean island nation’s economic situation has only worsened since then. The Cuban Communists have few options to right their sinking ship of state.
China and Russia could invest more to support Cuba’s energy infrastructure. Still, their means and incentive to provide necessary relief are marginal. The war in Ukraine greatly limits Russia’s economic power, and China would fear jeopardizing its own priorities with the Trump administration by risking Trump’s wrath in bolstering Cuba. While Cuba provides key support for both Russian military operations and Chinese intelligence activity targeting the U.S., geography makes it infeasible for a serious Sino-Russian contest with the U.S. over Cuba’s future.
The remarkable collapse of Maduro’s rule also poses another problem for Cuba, namely, in undermining the credibility of its security apparatus.
Cuba says that 32 of its citizens died attempting to prevent the Delta Force from securing Maduro and his wife. Reports suggest these personnel were drawn from military special forces units and the country’s DI intelligence service. The starkly one-sided outcome of this raid, illustrated as it was by a dominant display of American air, sea, and land power with no Americans killed in action, thus underlines Cuba’s inability to contest the U.S. military. Suddenly, U.S. military bases in Key West and Guantanamo Bay seem a lot closer.
Maduro’s loss is a particular blow to the prestige of the DI, which has long held a reputation as a small but extremely capable intelligence service. Developed under the tutelage of the Soviet Union’s KGB intelligence service and retaining close links with Russia, the DI remains an instrumental servant of the ruling Communist Party.
What happens next?
CAPTURING MADURO WAS THE EXTRAORDINARILY CHALLENGING BUT EASIER PART
What the Cuban military does or does not do would appear to be key. The military retains vast financial reserves, garnered through its domination of critical economic sectors, including tourism and remittances from U.S.-based expatriates. But as blackouts worsen and private finance continues to evaporate amid goods shortages, the regime will only face growing pressure. If the military is unwilling to fund capital investments to bolster energy supplies and improve living standards, the ingredients for internal revolt will continue to grow.
And while the DI and military have shown an impressive ability to crush dissent over the decades, it has been a long while since they have faced an American president who has both such a high appetite for risk and comfort with using military force. Put simply, while 2026 is sure to be a year of great consequence for Venezuela, it is unlikely to be so for Venezuela alone.
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