Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and his undersecretary, Elbridge Colby, have made clear that the United States will not engage in counterterrorism in Africa unless the cells pose a direct threat to the American homeland.
As Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin, or JNIM, an al Qaeda-linked insurgent group, tightens its blockade over Mali‘s capital, Bamako, regional officials are awakening to the possibility that a group as radical and uncompromising as the Islamic state could soon control vast swaths of territory in Africa. The White House and Pentagon may not deem Mali important, but the second-order effects could be huge.
American presidents too often act like history resets when their administration begins, but there is no such thing as a blank slate. The Mali crisis did not begin with President Donald Trump, but rather with former President Barack Obama when Libya collapsed. Obama opposed ground troops but ordered airstrikes to protect Libyans from Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi’s revenge. It was a “responsibility to protect,” explained Samantha Power, Obama’s former National Security Council aide.
When faced with a hornet’s nest, there are two good options: leave it alone or get rid of it. The compromise option of standing underneath and lightly tapping it with a stick is the worst option. That is essentially what Obama chose in Libya; however, a refusal to insert any special forces to secure Qadhafi’s weapons depots led to the mass armament of rebel, criminal, and jihadist groups who walked in and armed themselves to the teeth. The oversight was even more astounding given how, less than a decade before, Democratic nominee John Kerry, Obama’s secretary of state, used allegations that former President George W. Bush failed to secure 380 tons of explosives at Iraq’s al Qaqaa military base as his last-minute “October Surprise” to swing the election his way.
The Libyan weaponry not only condemned Libya to criminality and civil war, but weapons flowed southward into the Sahel, where established smuggling networks carried them to myriad insurgent and jihadist groups. The weaponry did not alone cause state failure or enable coups, but it did throw fuel on the fire. Mali, however, may have been an unfortunate exception. The west African state was once a model democracy with multiple peaceful transfers of power and a top Freedom House rating despite its poverty. Today, Mali is Afghanistan just prior to the Taliban takeover.
When JNIM takes Mali, though, the question becomes what next? Not only are al Qaeda affiliates not content to stop at national borders, but millions of Africans are unwilling to live under their austere rule. Mali might only have a population of 25 million, but the countries bordering it have a total population almost ten times that number. Few of the countries can absorb millions of refugees without themselves reaching the instability tipping point.
The biggest danger, however, might be Nigeria, just 900 miles away through Niger’s relatively unpopulated and undefended scrubland. Nigeria already struggles with Boko Haram in its north and Fulani militias in Nigeria’s middle belt. Both Nigeria’s delta and the overlapping Biafra region pose their own security challenges. Corruption further hampers Nigeria’s security response. Even relatively secure countries such as the Ivory Coast and Senegal could be in danger.
Mali’s collapse would light a long-term fuse. Across west Africa, most Muslims subscribe to the Maliki school of Islam, the moderate interpretations of which, relative to those in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, made the region a bastion of tolerance. Allowing JNIM to radicalize the African population could reverberate even further, into Morocco, Europe, and even the U.S.
The crises they never saw coming often define the national security legacies of U.S. administrations. The fall of Afghanistan stained Biden’s legacy in a way that no spin can cleanse. Trump may want to be remembered for Nobel Prize-worthy peace-dealing, but ignoring the rapidly escalating crisis in Mali and failing to stop its repercussions could be how generations remember him.
Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner‘s Beltway Confidential. He is the director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.