Ukraine this month unveiled the Flamingo, a new cruise missile still in the early stages of development. With a reported range of 1,864 miles and a 2,535-pound warhead, the missile would give Ukraine a weapon with a far more striking range than any it possesses. Even if the range estimate is exaggerated, this looks like a potent new weapon.
The Flamingo is designed for strikes against strategic targets such as command centers, airfields, and storage depots deep inside Russian territory. Its development is part of Ukraine’s broader effort to reduce its dependence on imported weapons and to prove that it can create advanced, homegrown systems. Manufacturer Fire Point says it hopes to be making seven Flamingos a day by October. Mass production is intended to start around early 2026.
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“We already have a strong production base,” a senior Ukrainian official told me.“Of course, it is just the beginning, but Russia had decades, and we had a year or two.”
The significance of the new missile is threefold.
First, Flamingo gives Kyiv combat options it has long lacked. Russia has enjoyed the advantage of striking Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with relative impunity from beyond the front lines. If Ukraine can continually hold at risk strategic targets inside Russia, it changes the calculus for the Kremlin. Strategic depth, which Moscow has relied on since Napoleon’s time, becomes a little less secure. When forces deep behind the lines are under threat, they must take time, financial, and stress-consuming measures to better protect themselves against even a possible strike.
Second, the missile allows Ukraine to skirt restrictions imposed upon it by Western powers that have provided it with longer-range weapons. The United States has traditionally insisted, for example, that Ukraine seek approval before using weapons to strike targets inside Russia. Flamingo gets around this.
But the larger story is how this missile reflects Ukraine’s ability to modernize its defense industry. Building a missile of this complexity requires not just engineering skill but also a system of suppliers and testing grounds. The Flamingo is not an isolated case. Ukraine has also developed a flourishing drone industry over the past three years. From small, cheap drones used to disrupt Russian armor to larger strike drones capable of reaching oil refineries deep in Russia. That same spirit now underpins missile development.
There is a historical precedent here worth remembering. Faced with existential threats since its birth, Israel invested heavily in creating its own defense industry. Out of necessity, it developed some of the most advanced missile, air-defense, and drone systems in the world. Today, Israel not only defends itself with them but also exports them to allies globally. Ukraine is beginning to sketch a similar trajectory. If given the political space, financial resources, and technological cooperation, it could, over time, become one of Europe’s leading arms innovators.
This matters beyond the immediate war. A self-sufficient Ukrainian defense sector is not only about surviving Russia’s current invasion — it is about deterring the next one. A Ukraine with strong military manufacturing would make any future Russian aggression costlier, riskier, and less likely to succeed.
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Yet assessing the Flamingo’s battlefield effectiveness is so far unclear, details are scarce, and official data are closely held, making it hard to assess how well the missile performs in practice. Complicating matters further, Ukraine’s anticorruption bureau has opened an investigation into Fire Point over suspicions that it may have inflated component costs or overstated deliveries to the Defense Ministry. Fire Point has acknowledged the inquiry but downplayed its significance, dismissing the concerns as baseless.
The Flamingo may still be in incubation, but it is proof that Ukraine can, over time, build the kind of defense industry that complements and eventually balances Western supply. The Western allies should recognize this potential and support it, not just to win today’s war but to prevent the next.