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A significant U.S. Navy task force, including the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, is sailing toward Venezuela.
This military activity follows White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt’s statement last week that President Donald Trump was committed to using “every element of American power” to confront Venezuelan drug smuggling. Leavitt added, “The Maduro regime is not the legitimate government of Venezuela, it is a narco-terror cartel, and Maduro, it is the view of this administration, is not a legitimate president. He is a fugitive head of this cartel who has been indicted in the United States.” The Trump administration has offered a $50 million reward for Maduro’s arrest and receipt by U.S. authorities and has increased bounties on other regime officials.
What’s going on here?
To be clear, a U.S. invasion designed to remove Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from power is highly unlikely. That objective would require sustained military operations of uncertain duration, human cost, and political outcome — something for which there is very little appetite in the White House and Defense Department. Moreover, a U.S. invasion would see the deployment of carrier strike groups as part of this task force and the mobilization of various Army brigades and Marine divisions. Instead, Trump appears focused on a narrower objective: weakening Maduro’s regime and the Venezuela-based Cartel of the Suns drug trafficking organization.
Existing under Maduro’s ultimate authority and top government minister Diosdado Cabello’s practical control, the Cartel of the Suns benefits from direct military and government collusion. It uses this security guarantee to export vast quantities of drugs out of Venezuelan ports, into the Atlantic Ocean, and off to various foreign markets.
In that regard, this U.S. naval activity is significant. The task force includes three heavily armed destroyers: the USS Sampson, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Gravely. After a delay due to weather conditions last week, the 22nd MEU also departed Virginia for Venezuelan-proximate waters on Monday. The MEU is embarked upon the USS Iwo Jima helicopter carrier, and the USS Fort Lauderdale and USS San Antonio, amphibious transport ships designed for Marine landing operations. The Marine force consists of a reinforced aviation squadron, a combat logistics battalion, and the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment.
This force carries means of both political deterrence and military power.
While the MEU’s aviation squadron provides Osprey tiltrotor transport aircraft, its “reinforced” designator likely means it is also hosting AV-8B Harrier jets from Marine attack squadron VMA-223 — this probability is given further credence by Navy social media posts. Although Harriers are primarily employed for air-to-ground support, they can also engage in air combat operations.
The centerpiece of the 22nd MEU is its Battalion Landing Team. This ground combat element consists of three rifle companies, each numbering approximately 200 Marines, and a weapons company armed with anti-armor and mortar weapons. Put simply, the MEU provides a small but potent ground combat force. Alongside surprise airborne operations from other U.S. forces, the MEU could feasibly seize beachheads and airfields to establish strongholds for follow-on operations.
Reuters reports that the attack submarine USS Newport News and guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie are also being sent toward Venezuela.
Trump is sending a message here. Submarine deployments are very rarely announced in advance due to concerns that Chinese or Russian forces might seek to exploit that information in their own deployments. The Washington Examiner understands that the USS Newport News has been focused on allied submarine exercises and countering Russian submarine operations in the North Atlantic over the summer. Lake Erie is effectively a floating missile base capable of striking land, air, and naval targets at various ranges.
In these actions, the Trump administration is sacrificing the element of military surprise to pressure Maduro’s regime politically. It’s working, and Maduro is plainly concerned. His regime has responded to the U.S. deployments by propaganda-heavy reserve mobilizations, calls for diplomatic support from China, a close partner, and, in a thin olive branch gesture to Trump, by advertising new counter-drug operations in state media.
Again, as it stands, this U.S. task force is insufficient to remove Maduro from power forcibly. But it most certainly would be sufficient to conduct significant operations. These include limited raids or strikes against Venezuelan drug-related targets, the enforcement of counter-drug smuggling ship boarding and inspection operations, and the imposition of a naval embargo on Venezuelan oil exports.
It would be risky to assume Trump is engaged in theatrics here. The president views the inflow of drugs across U.S. borders as a preeminent national security concern. And it’s not just Venezuela that Trump is concerned about. The CIA is significantly ramping up activity against increasingly powerful Mexican cartels, with President Claudia Sheinbaum fearing Trump may order unilateral military action against the drug traffickers.
What will Trump do once U.S. forces are in place?
While an oil embargo would put extraordinary financial pressure on Maduro’s regime that might actually lead it to reduce its drug export extravaganzas, Trump has sent mixed signals. In July, for example, the Trump administration granted Chevron Corporation a sanctions waiver to resume oil extraction operations inside Venezuela.
Still, this task force appears too large in scale, too expensive in operating costs, and too demanding of military assets already in very short supply to simply be for show. Unilateral U.S. military inspections of Venezuelan cargo ships suspected of carrying drugs and evading oil export sanctions are thus likely. Limited strikes on land-based Venezuelan drug facilities and personnel are also possible.
WILL TRUMP KEEP LETTING PUTIN PLAY HIM FOR TIME?
But if the task force comes under Venezuelan attack, broader U.S. action to degrade Maduro’s military base of power may follow.
In that scenario, unpredictable escalation is a distinct possibility.