ADEN, Yemen — When the war on the Houthis erupted, Saudi Arabia was its front line. The United States saw Saudi Arabia as its ally. Even President Barack Obama supported Saudi efforts, providing U.S. intelligence and aerial refueling to support Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign.
As the threats from Yemen grew, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates divided their roles. Saudi Arabia focused on fighting the Houthis who emanated from near the Saudi border, while the Emiratis focused on combating Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that had established itself in southern Yemen.
In short, the Emiratis succeeded first in Aden and then in the Hadhramawt, but the Saudis flailed. No amount of Saudi spin can depict the Houthis’ decadelong occupation of Sana’a as anything more than Saudi failure.
As the Saudis failed to rebuff the Houthis, their Plan B has been to appease them and, by extension, Iran. The Saudi idea was simple: Saudi authorities would turn a blind eye to Houthi aggression, terrorism, sectarian violence, and resupply in Yemen, and in exchange the Houthis and their Iranian backers would concentrate their fire on non-Saudi targets. For the Saudis, this was a significant win as the Houthis had earlier fired hundreds of missiles and drones at Saudi airports, cities, and oil infrastructure. Essentially, Saudi Arabia’s new strategy was based on fear and purchasing quiet, not on a desire to win.
To be fair, a sense of American betrayal also colored the Saudi choice to appease the Houthis. The Saudis sacrificed tremendously in blood and money to contain the Iranian-backed proxy group only to have President Joe Biden and American progressives criticize them and threaten sanctions. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s de-listing of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization was both counter-faction and, from Riyadh’s perspective, gratuitously nasty.
While Saudis hoped President Donald Trump would resume the warm ties that characterized his first term, his separate deal to end the U.S. campaign against the Houthis reminded Riyadh that they should not trust American guarantees. Ironically, the Saudis do not recognize that Yemenis now view Riyadh in much the same way as Saudis view Washington.
Complicating matters is the Saudi-Emirati rivalry. In southern Yemen, the Emiratis not only defeated Al Qaeda, but they also built infrastructure: revitalizing airports, paving roads, and building ports and pipelines. Abu Dhabi also helped the Southern Transitional Council and Salafi independents grow their capacity to govern with continued investment. Saudi Arabia achieved nothing comparable.
Enter Saudi petulance. Just as in Sudan, where the Saudis and Emiratis support opposite sides, Saudis prioritize undercutting their Emirati rivals rather than defeating a Houthi threat that seeks to conquer the entire region.
Saudi intelligence began underwriting tribal groups in Yemen’s sparsely populated Mahrah and Hadhramawt provinces, through which the Houthis and Muslim Brotherhood seek to smuggle weapons, and they began sponsoring rivals to undercut the Southern Transitional Council and the Southern Giants, a tribal anti-Houthi group.
Saudi authorities also reprise the plausible deniability they embraced toward Al Qaeda in the pre-9/11 era. Then, the Saudi government denied involvement but ignored Saudi elites’ private donations to the group. Now, while the Saudi government denies funding terrorists, Saudi princes and businessmen pour millions of dollars into Islah, Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood group whose leaders collude with both the Houthis and Al Qaeda.
IDF SAYS STRIKE ON GAZAN CATHOLIC CHURCH WAS ACCIDENTAL
Trump may prefer a hands-off approach to the region, but disinterest has a cost. Just as Turkey interprets Trump’s disinterest as a greenlight to support Hamas, Al Qaeda, and even the Islamic State, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman coasts on his personal relationship with Trump while his country actively undermines peace in Yemen and increasingly sponsors terrorism and seeks to buy quiet from, if not empower, an Iranian proxy and Muslim Brotherhood terrorists, even at the cost of our allies’ security and potentially American lives.
Prior to September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia flirted with being a state sponsor of terrorism. Almost a quarter century later, it repeats itself as America sleeps.
Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential. He is director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.