Last week, Chinese authorities detained Chenyue Mao, a U.S. citizen and former Wells Fargo executive, during what was supposed to be a short family visit to Shanghai. Wells Fargo clarified that Mao was placed on an exit ban unrelated to her work, but this tactic is nothing new. This is the latest reminder that when it comes to China, citizenship doesn’t mean what we think it means. It merely represents another means of exploitation.
Mao’s ordeal illustrates the long arc of China’s strategy to entrench itself in American institutions and exploit the openness of the liberal system.
It largely began in the 1990s with China’s Most Favored Nation status and World Trade Organization accession. Western economists confidently predicted that the country would play fair and that economic engagement would liberalize its politics.
Instead, we now find ourselves in a world where party loyalty tests, national security blackmail, and surveillance-state behavior creep into the very institutions underpinning Western finance and governance.
Wells Fargo is not just any company. It is one of the “Big Four” banks that anchors global markets. That someone connected to its senior ranks can be caught in an authoritarian trap is a deeply concerning reality for the corporate world. The Chinese Communist Party has not and will not obey the rules of such a system, so we should act to deter them accordingly.
This is not an isolated incident, either. In 2023, Chinese-born U.S. citizens Charles Wang Zhonghe and Mark Chan were also detained under the pretext of “cooperation” with civil litigation. Chan has not yet been permitted to leave the country. Behind these legal facades is a strategy enabled by China’s Exit and Entry Administration Law, which provides the regime sweeping authority to detain foreign nationals, often using them as leverage in diplomatic or commercial disputes.
Crucially, China’s governing logic often evades the Western mind. As one expert said, “You cannot understand China through Western lenses.” The CCP has long since abandoned the idea of convergence with liberal norms. Instead, under President Xi Jinping, it has pursued a “Chinese path to modernization” expressly distinct from Western civilization.
This path, by design, involves reasserting CCP control across all aspects of life, including business dealings abroad. And yet, too many American institutions operate as if it’s 2001, pretending that globalization has tamed the dragon.
It has not.
In fact, China, though not a monolith, has crescendoed in its desire to influence the world stage. Its national security laws claim extraterritorial jurisdiction, its state-owned enterprises are inseparable from the regime, and its tech platforms, such as TikTok, operate as data-collection engines for Beijing.
This has serious implications for national security, one of our government’s chief concerns. As some have put it, we are in the early stages of Cold War 2.0. If so, we should act like it.
The Trump administration, to its credit, began a shift by imposing tariffs, restricting Chinese access to U.S. capital markets, and confronting tech espionage. But more must be done. We need a modernized containment doctrine that addresses the full spectrum of China’s financial, technological, and cultural influence.
We also need stricter foreign influence laws, clearer oversight of dual-national risks in sensitive sectors, and a robust discussion on decoupling.
JAPAN’S WELCOME ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CHINA THREAT
China plays a long game, and it’s high time we remembered how to play defense. As the Federalists warned long ago, a nation that cannot defend its institutions will not keep them for long.
China seems to be in it for the foreseeable future.