As the Shiite holy month of Muharram begins on June 26, 2025, President Donald Trump is desperate to pause fighting lest religious passions spiral out of control in the Middle East. As the Middle East quiets, at least temporarily, Americans should take stock.
Wherever we stand on the Israel–Iran conflict or, for that matter, the Russia–Ukraine war, it is undeniable that both Israel and Ukraine thought outside the box. Israel’s castration of Hezbollah with self-destructing beepers was an operation years in the making, and its ability to eliminate top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders in the first minutes of conflict shocked both Iranians and outside observers. The Israeli operations were the result of penetration and spy craft that took decades to prepare.
Ukraine’s June 1, 2025, drone strike that destroyed or damaged one-third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet shocked the Kremlin with its audacity. Ukraine carefully smuggled drones in parts into Russia and then had trucks deliver them to the outskirts of bases from which operators could launch the drones remotely. Israel, too, smuggled drones into Iran in parts to bypass Iranian early warning and radar systems and then had operatives assemble them, taking the Islamic Republic by surprise.
I previously questioned if the U.S. military and intelligence community should learn more from how Israel and Ukraine wage war rather than lecture Jerusalem and Kyiv to do things the way the United States does. Innovation should be applauded, not frustrated.
While too many U.S. officials act more as pundits than strategists, another question looms large: Could U.S. adversaries use the same outside-of-the-box thinking that has kneecapped Russia and Iran against the U.S.?
Put more bluntly, could communist China’s systematic purchase of farmland around U.S. military bases have less to do with spying and more to do with acquiring a launch pad for drones that may already be in place?
While ports remain alert to smuggling of dirty bombs and other radiological material, do they have systems in place to detect and prevent the smuggling of drone parts that sleeper cells could then reassemble?
Another aspect of Israel’s and Ukraine’s strategies has been the assassination of key leaders. Both countries carefully tracked the whereabouts of foreign military officers to the granularity of knowing not only their houses and apartments, but also the rooms in which they slept and with whom. When war began, they unleashed assassins.
It is likely that adversaries — not only Russia and China but also potentially second-tier states such as North Korea and Pakistan — have done likewise. Have U.S. counterintelligence officials tracked which foreign operatives or their American agents have collected such information? Do they have the means to protect each senior military or intelligence leader, let alone key legislative branch officials, as soon as intelligence shows war is possible? Does the FBI have confidence that it can prevent a surprise opening salvo that involves the assassination of 500 U.S. military, political, and intelligence leaders, and perhaps even leaders of industry?
Cyber operations were also core components of Israeli and Ukrainian operations. While the U.S. is prepared to counter cyber intrusions against isolated facilities and focused on preventing cyber-theft of technology or hacking of secure communications, is it prepared for a mass cyber-sabotage campaign that could cease American communications or take out the electricity grid as completely as an electromagnetic pulse would?
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If there is one takeaway Pentagon planners should recognize, it is that the next war the U.S. faces will likely begin with covert action launched from within the U.S. rather than a missile salvo detectable by radar or a Pearl Harbor–style air raid.
The Israel–Iran and Russia–Ukraine conflicts are warnings. It is not clear, however, whether U.S. leaders have awoken to the real lessons they present.
Michael Rubin is a contributor to the Washington Examiner‘s Beltway Confidential. He is the director of analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.