When Iran’s supreme leader speaks, the world expects a predictable mix of praise for his Palestinian allies, blustery predictions of Israel’s demise, and bitter denunciations of the Great Satan (the United States). Any departure from Ali Khamenei’s usual script is worth noting.
In his recent Eid al-Fitr prayer sermon, Khamenei added something as surprising as it was revealing: an emphatic expression of anxiety unusual for a regime that normally projects omnipotence.
Of course, his sermons are rarely purely religious but rather signals of policy and national sentiment from the commanding heights of the Islamic Republic. This year, Khamenei laid bare the nightmare haunting the regime’s leadership: the specter of foreign military intervention, the persistent possibility for mass internal unrest framed as “sedition,” and the targeted assassination of top officials. Most telling, perhaps, was the implicit acknowledgment that the convergence of these threats could pose no less than an existential challenge to the regime, especially after a series of Israeli strategic victories and a toughening of American resolve.
For the leader of any power to reveal so much vulnerability should be taken seriously. If the leader is worried, his followers cannot be far behind. Cracks in the armor of authoritarian regimes tend to spread when morale is shaken.
First among his articulated fears is the possibility of an external attack. Khamenei addressed this directly, stating, “If malice comes from outside, which is unlikely, they will certainly receive a strong reciprocal blow.” The qualifier “unlikely” attempts to project confidence, yet the very act of addressing the threat underscores its presence in Tehran’s strategic calculus. In a region simmering with tension, particularly involving long-standing adversaries such as Israel and the United States, this preemptive warning serves both as deterrence and possibly as preparation for the domestic audience.
Equally palpable is the leadership’s anxiety over internal dissent, which Khamenei characteristically framed as foreign-instigated “sedition” or fitna. He warned, “If the enemy, like in previous years, thinks of creating sedition internally, the nation, like in those years, will give a strong response to the seditionists.” The phrase “previous years” is a clear reference to significant waves of protest that have shaken the regime over the last decade, waves of widespread demonstrations in 2017 and 2019, and protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, who was arrested simply for not wearing the hijab.
Since 2017, there has been a significant shift in Iran’s political arena. On one side, the revolution discourse has replaced the reform discourse, and on the other hand, the appeal to patriotism has overshadowed Islamism.
By labeling possible future unrest as enemy-driven “sedition,” the regime continues its long-standing practice of attempting to delegitimize genuine popular grievances. However, this rhetoric also betrays an underlying awareness that the embers of discontent remain potent and could easily reignite, requiring a promise of forceful suppression.
The third specific fear highlighted was the possibility of targeted assassination of officials, a threat Khamenei explicitly attributed to external foes. “Israel assassinates and says, ‘I assassinated,’” Khamenei asserted, adding pointedly that “America and Western governments support [it]” while “the rest watch.” This points to a vulnerability that directly affects the regime’s operational capacity and morale.
The loss of key military commanders, scientists, or political figures through targeted strikes and assassination is a tangible threat that has materialized in the past. More recently, homegrown lone wolves have been targeting the regime’s officials. The convergence of an Israeli and possibly American assassination campaign with lone-wolf operations to eliminate regime officials paints a picture of a regime feeling vulnerable at its core.
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These are not isolated, separate anxieties. A major external conflict could exacerbate domestic economic hardship, fuel internal unrest, and prevent the regime from effectively mobilizing domestic security forces. Conversely, significant internal turmoil could create perceived opportunities for external adversaries or weaken the regime’s ability to respond effectively to attacks or assassinations.
Khamenei’s Eid sermon paints a picture of a regime feeling besieged from without, wary of its own population within, and vulnerable to precise, possibly decapitating strikes. The constant reliance on blaming external enemies and promising forceful repression highlights a possible brittleness beneath the hardened exterior. The anxieties voiced by Iran’s supreme leader suggest a leadership acutely conscious that its grip on power faces a complex challenge and that stability is far from guaranteed.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior adviser for Iran and financial economics at FDD, specializing in Iran’s economy and financial markets, sanctions, and illicit finance. Follow him on LinkedIn and X @SGhasseminejad.