Admiral confirms Ukraine-Pacific weapons trade-off

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Adm. Sam Paparo leads the U.S. military’s Indo-Pacific Command. INDOPACOM is responsible for deterring and, if necessary, defeating China in what would be the nation’s largest war effort since 1945. Fortunately, Paparo is widely regarded within the U.S. military, intelligence community, and by close allies as an exceptionally impressive officer.

That matters because what Paparo had to say at the Brookings Institution on Tuesday deserves close contemplation.

Paparo warned that U.S. weapons supplies to Ukraine are undermining U.S. deterrence in the Pacific. Noting that he was unconcerned with the supply of short-range weapons to Ukraine, Paparo added, “With some of the Patriots that have been employed, some of the air-to-air missiles that have been employed, it’s now eating into stocks, you know, and to say otherwise would be dishonest. … Inherently, it imposes costs on the readiness of America to respond in the Indo-Pacific region, which is the most stressing theater for the quantity and quality of munitions, because [China] is the most capable potential adversary in the world.” Paparo emphasized the word “inherently.” The admiral summed up, “We should replenish those stocks and then some. I was already dissatisfied with the [arms stockpile], and I’m a little more dissatisfied with the [arms stockpile since the start of the war in Ukraine]. You know, it’s a time for straight talk.”

This is overdue vindication for solitary voices such as former Trump administration official Elbridge Colby. Colby, who may be appointed to a position in Trump’s second administration, has repeatedly argued that the depletion of U.S. arms stocks in Ukraine is jeopardizing America’s deterrent posture against China.

To be clear, this doesn’t necessarily mean that Colby is correct in calling for significant reductions in arms supplies to Ukraine. I personally believe a more moderate balancing approach should be applied to future arms supplies, making hard judgment calls on which individual weapons systems would boost Ukraine’s key capabilities. And secondly, how many of these weapons the United States can provide at a tolerable cost to U.S. deterrence in the Pacific.

But the key words here are “hard judgment calls.” The hard judgment call that recognizes weapons do not grow on trees and that the choice to expend a weapon in one place means that the weapon cannot be expended in another place. This is a reality that far too many in Washington have refused to accept in recent years. The associated truth is that the U.S. cannot effectively deter China by maintaining its present naval and air deployment structure in the Middle East and Europe. As proven by the recent dislocation of a carrier strike group from the Pacific to the Middle East, this is not a debatable point.

Even in the best-case scenario, fixing these problems cannot happen overnight. In turn, innovation and once-unthinkable choices deserve new consideration. These include building warships abroad and dramatically boosting the munitions industrial base so that more long-range anti-ship, anti-air, and land attack missiles can be stockpiled. But cheaper weapons such as drones and rejigged bombs also need to be produced at scale. Crucially, also, where defense contractors fail to deliver on time and at cost, they must face more severe penalties from the Pentagon (in concert with new congressional authorities to impose penalties).

President-elect Donald Trump should endeavor to address these concerns.

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At the same time, the Air Force and Navy need relief from European and Middle Eastern taskings to provide greater contingency readiness for operations in the Pacific.

But Washington also needs more honesty. I believe that some arms supplies in support of Ukraine are necessary and pursuant to U.S. national security interests. But those arms supplies cannot exist as an open checkbook without incurring significant costs to preeminent U.S. national security concerns. And the debate over what constitutes an acceptable risk should be enjoined far more openly.

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