The top-line fact in the weapons to Ukraine or Taiwan debate
Tom Rogan
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An important debate is underway in Washington. It centers on whether the United States should prioritize its supply of weapons to Ukraine or Taiwan. This debate is welcome. What should not be welcome, however, is the suggestion that the U.S. can provide maximal weapons support to both nations at the same time.
It cannot.
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Elbridge Colby and Alex Velez-Green note the basic point in their Washington Post op-ed on Thursday. As they put it, “The fact is that both Ukraine and Taiwan need many of the same weapons, the United States only has limited quantities of those weapons in its available stockpiles, and our defense industry will not be able to produce enough of these critical capabilities for years.”
Bingo.
Don’t get me wrong. This is not to say that Colby and Velez-Green are necessarily right in their argument that where munition stocks are in competition between Ukraine and Taiwan, the latter must come first. I share their perspective, but there are good arguments on either side. It’s worth noting, for example, that Taiwan’s defense spending remains absurdly inadequate. It’s also feasible that Taiwan may elect a new government in 2024 that lacks sufficient resolve to fight China. In contrast, Ukraine has shown not just the resolve to fight against overwhelming odds, but the spirit to win.
Top line: The U.S. must be willing to accept that there are no easy answers here. It is simply not credible, for example, to argue that the U.S. can provide maximal support to both nations simply by strengthening its munitions industrial base. That’s a long-term solution to the problem but not one that will deliver sufficient dividends until at least the late 2020s. Yes, were the president and Congress to agree that a crash munitions program were needed and were they to allocate funds accordingly, the munitions gap could be addressed within a couple of years. But political reality matters, and the political reality is that such a crash munitions program simply isn’t going to happen.
That leaves us with the basic challenge: Should we give the next Javelin missile system to Ukraine so that it can attack Russian tanks today? Or should we give it to Taiwan so that it can build a stockpile to defeat the PLA amphibious fighting vehicles that would spearhead any invasion? Should we give Ukraine a Harpoon system so that it can target Russian naval forces in the Black Sea today or give it to Taiwan so it can build a stockpile to target PLA landing vessels tomorrow? The same principle applies to weapons systems such as HIMARS rocket artillery, Stinger air-to-air missiles, and drones.
True, we know Ukraine is resisting a brutal invasion today. We know that it is in the U.S. interest that Ukraine be victorious. We do not know when Xi will attack Taiwan, though most informed analysts believe it is now only a question of when, not if. But we also know that the PLA would fight with massed forces that will have a heavy capacity to absorb losses without suffering strategic defeat. And we know that China’s seizure of Taiwan would cause catastrophic damage to the U.S. global architecture (just look at what America’s oldest ally is already doing). It is thus of great U.S. national importance that Taiwan boost its munition stocks today.
Again, there are good answers on either side of this argument. But let’s stop pretending that Harpoons grow on trees. The recognition of hard choices is necessary for any credible discussion on this concern.