How US nuclear submarine visits to South Korea are focused on North Korea and China
Tom Rogan
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For the first time since the Cold War, Washington and Seoul have agreed that U.S. Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines will make frequent port visits to South Korea. The public message is that of deterrence against North Korea. But it’s clear that U.S. deterrence of China also looms large.
Kim Jong-un bears prime responsibility for this announcement.
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It is Kim, after all, who is increasing his ballistic missile tests and threatening new nuclear weapons tests. By sending U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarines to South Korea, the two allies hope to broadcast their resolve to meet any North Korean threat across the range of prospective conflict. North Korea cannot track or destroy U.S. submarines with any meaningful confidence, so this signaling is essentially that of: “We own the nuclear threat curve.”
Interestingly, these visits will actually weaken U.S. nuclear deterrence while the boats are at port.
That’s because the submarines’ Trident missiles have a minimum launch range. A U.S. submarine would likely have to be operating at least a day’s sail distant from South Korea in order to get its Trident missiles onto a minimum-range ballistic trajectory. The problem for North Korea is that the U.S. has at least two Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines on station in the Pacific at any one time. This is to ensure nuclear strike redundancy against China, North Korea, and Russia.
This, of course, also presents problems for China.
While the People’s Liberation Army’s submarine force is developing, it still lags behind the proficiency of both U.S. attack and ballistic submarines and their crews. Especially when it comes to the USS Jimmy Carter spy submarine, which is able to get very, very close to China and Russia undetected. The PLA can likely detect U.S. submarines in areas of the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, but it cannot effectively detect them in the Western Pacific.
Thus China has very little means of shadowing U.S. ballistic missile submarines in their optimal China-target patrol sectors. The U.S. can and does, however, effectively track PLA ballistic missile submarines in their patrol sectors.
With public port visits to South Korea, the U.S. puts its nuclear forces right on China’s doorstep while Beijing knows it can do little in response. This must be an intentional choice on the part of the Biden administration.
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The White House will have no doubts as to China’s anger over this announcement and, as with Russia, is normally risk-averse on escalatory matters. That said, this submarine announcement is likely designed in response to two specific Chinese actions. First, to boost U.S. nuclear deterrence in the face of China’s unprecedented development of its strategic nuclear forces. Second, to signal that Beijing will not be able to use Kim as an easy pressure point via which to extract concessions from Washington.
The top line, however, is clear: this announcement is about both North Korea and China. Not just the former.