Arab governments rush to make amends with Assad
Daniel DePetris
Syrian dictator Bashar Assad used to be an international outcast, Syria’s equivalent of Kim Jong Un. The Syrian dictator had few partners and even fewer friends. Shut out from the West, isolated from the international banking system, and ostracized from much of the Arab world, Assad was at the mercy of Iran, Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and what was left of the Syrian army to squash the armed opposition against his regime.
Things have gotten noticeably better for the war criminal. The United States and Europe still don’t want anything to do with the man who shot, starved, and gassed his people into submission, but Assad’s Arab neighbors don’t see things the same way. The Jordanian, Egyptian, and Emirati foreign ministers, all of whom represent countries that once armed or sheltered the insurgency against Assad, have traveled to the dictator’s capital to offer humanitarian assistance and improve bilateral relations.
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For the first time in 12 years, Syria’s foreign minister set foot on Saudi soil for an official visit. The trip was indicative of Syria’s slow reemergence into the Arab political fold after over a decade of isolation. If there was any doubt that Syria’s isolation was thawing, Syrian and Saudi officials let it be known that they were working on reopening embassies and resuming direct flights. If carried to its full conclusion, normalization with Saudi Arabia would be a coup for Assad, who would then be one step closer to rejoining the Arab League as a full member.
Why are Assad’s former enemies suddenly playing nice? The change of tune has nothing to do with sentimentality or even sympathy for the Syrian people. The Gulf Arab states, which never had an especially warm relationship with the Assad family, still look at the lanky 57-year-old eye doctor and see a ruthless tyrant entirely beholden to the Iranians and the Russians. The Saudis aren’t naive; they recognize that the Assad family dictatorship owes its existence to Tehran and is therefore unlikely to boot Iranian forces out of the country.
Even so, the Saudis, Jordanians, Emiratis, and Egyptians (among others) also understand that Assad has survived the insurgency against him and could very well rule over Syria (health permitting) for another two or three decades.
Arab governments may despise Assad personally and prefer him to be dead or in prison for crimes against humanity. But you don’t need to be somebody’s friend in order to work with him. Jordan and Saudi Arabia need Syria’s cooperation to combat the illicit multibillion-dollar Captagon drug trade, ironically facilitated by Assad’s younger brother, Maher. The UAE, always searching for business opportunities, would like to have a piece of the Syrian market. Iraq wants to reopen lucrative trade routes through Syria. Egypt, meanwhile, wants its companies to win reconstruction contracts in Syria. None of this is possible without Assad’s buy-in or acquiescence.
U.S. officials are responding to the diplomatic overtures with consternation. The State Department is opposed to anybody reconciling with the Assad government and reiterates that a similar normalization with Damascus is not on the table. The Biden administration will only think about a change in policy if Assad negotiates with the political opposition, releases political prisoners, allows a transitional government to take hold, and allows free and fair elections. Yet the Syrian strongman has no interest or incentive to do any of these things. If Assad was unwilling to offer concessions when his army was at risk of disintegrating, he won’t be willing to compromise when his forces are in control of most of Syria’s population.
Washington finds itself on the opposite side of its Arab partners. Right now, the Biden administration isn’t making Assad’s normalization with the Arab world a big issue. But if (or likely, when) the normalization process is eventually complete and Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian companies begin dipping their toes into the Syrian market, the U.S. will confront an awkward dilemma: Does it sanction its Arab partners for financing projects that benefit the Syrian government, as U.S. law requires? Or does it bite its lip and issue a national security waiver to save itself the trouble of a diplomatic crisis? There are no good choices, and I don’t envy the policymakers who need to make them.
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Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.