Dealing with Moscow after Russia is defeated in Ukraine
Janusz Bugajski
It’s clear that Russia faces a potential military calamity in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are gearing up for a major counter-offensive this spring. The severity of that defeat will be measured by Moscow’s military casualties and the territory it surrenders. It will also raise an urgent question for the Western alliance — how to handle a defeated Russia.
Devastating military losses will chronically weaken the Russian state.
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The incompetence of the ruling elite and the deep-rooted corruption in the army and security services will spark power struggles in the Kremlin. Simultaneously, the contracting economy, collapsing budget revenues, and falling living standards will generate public opposition in dozens of federal regions. Signs of conflict between Moscow and its far-flung regions and between military and civilians are already visible and can rapidly multiply as armed units return from the front.
For Washington and Brussels, the biggest challenge will be to manage the repercussions of Russia’s defeat. Comparisons with Nazi Germany after the Second World War are misleading. Germany was occupied, de-militarized, de-Nazified, de-imperialized, and divided. No power is planning to emulate this inside Russia. At the same time, a Russia in deep turmoil cannot simply rejoin the international system and have economic sanctions lifted, as this could revive its rapacious imperial elite.
The only practical solution without foreign occupation is to devise plans for managing the volatile dissolution of the failing federation.
First, NATO must strengthen the defense of countries bordering Russia to deter any attempts by Moscow to engineer conflicts and distract attention from its internal crisis. The presence of multi-national NATO forces should increase among member states, while NATO partners should obtain weapons systems that help shield them from any Kremlin provocations. Russia’s offensive capabilities will weaken as the defensive capabilities of allies, and partners are bolstered.
A second key element in dealing with a militarily vanquished Russia would be to establish a policy planning team in Washington focused on the country’s impending rupture. It can develop contingencies for a range of scenarios inside Russia. In parallel, a “conflict planning” center at NATO HQ in Brussels should be assembled to deal specifically with scenarios of regional instability generated by Russia’s state failure.
Attention should focus on working closely with Russia’s neighbors in monitoring political and economic conditions in all federal regions. Policies must be devised in response to destabilizing power struggles in Moscow, spreading civil strife, and growing federal cleavages.
The overarching goal would be to ensure that Russia’s implosions undercut its aggressive imperial aspirations by engaging with politicians, parties, republics, and regions seeking improved ties with the West.
As Moscow weakens, former Russian allies will also reach out to the West, including Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. An effective U.S. policy cannot focus solely on democracy promotion but must be geo-strategic to promote state independence and undercut all negative Russian influences that damage Western interests.
The third essential ingredient in dealing with an imploding Russia is to support national and regional emancipation.
If genuine federalism is not implemented following Moscow’s military defeat, then the most constructive solution would be the formation of new states, as witnessed during the collapse of Soviet communism. Washington and Brussels should be at the forefront of cultivating linkages with new entities to encourage democracy, minority rights, international trade, and investment. With growing cross-border cooperation beneficial to local populations, it will be difficult for the Kremlin to whip up national hostility against the West.
Diplomatic support must be afforded to all post-Russia republics and regions opting for independence. To encourage peaceful transitions toward statehood, Western capitals can offer to mediate between disputing parties and emerging entities, whether over minority rights, resources, or territories.
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While the West cannot determine Russia’s dissolution, it can certainly make positive contributions to the evolution of new states and future allies.
Janusz Bugajski is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC. His new book is Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture.