What China’s balloon was doing

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APTOPIX US Chinese Balloon South Carolina
In this photo provided by Chad Fish, a large balloon drifts above the Atlantic Ocean, just off the coast of South Carolina, with a fighter jet and its contrail seen below it, Saturday, Feb. 4, 2023. The balloon was struck by a missile from an F-22 fighter just off Myrtle Beach, fascinating sky-watchers across a populous area known as the Grand Strand for its miles of beaches that draw retirees and vacationers. (Chad Fish via AP)

What China’s balloon was doing

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What was the Chinese spy balloon, likely operated by either the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force or its Rocket Force, trying to do?

First off, it’s important to note that while the balloon became a focus of almost obsessive U.S. national attention, the PLA values its balloon operations as a generally deniable and clandestine means of intelligence collection. As with its covert drone activity, PLA doctrine explicitly relies on the stigma surrounding UFOs as a prodigious cover for its balloon operations. But alongside China’s anticipation of near-term conflict over Taiwan, a Washington Examiner assessment of PLA balloon operations offers a number of possible motives for this flight.

CHINA’S SELF-INFLICTED BALLOON SHOT

Let’s start with targeting intelligence.

Images of the balloon’s sensor/power array and a broader assessment of PLA balloon operations strongly indicate this balloon was involved in wide-angle imaging operations and possibly ground-focused radar activity. This bears particular note due to the balloon’s loitering over a U.S. base in Montana that had nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. The balloon’s ability to manipulate its speed and cameras would feasibly provide the PLA with more accurate targeting and tactics toward a prospective nuclear strike on the United States.

This is not to say China plans or anticipates such a strike, but this balloon fits with Beijing’s increasingly aggressive nuclear posture. The balloon would also feasibly allow for intelligence-gathering on the speed and nature of U.S. defensive responses to its presence. Again, this would provide valuable insight into U.S. military doctrine, as well as America’s readiness and force posture.

The balloon was also likely engaged in monitoring high-altitude weather conditions above the U.S., which is valuable for future operations. It also likely sought to monitor U.S. military and civilian communications and electromagnetic emanations. The balloon may have been equipped with laser, infrared, microwave, or other sensor systems. It may have attempted to map or monitor civilian Wi-Fi and cellular communications. Of exigent note, the balloon transited not simply ICBM silos, but also areas that are frequently utilized by the U.S. military’s Strategic Command for extremely sensitive training and operational activity related to nuclear command and control. This later transit may have been incidental, however, as the U.S. military began jamming the balloon’s control and collection efforts after it loitered over Montana (whether this jamming was 100% successful is unclear).

Next up, there’s the political intelligence element.

The balloon’s primary mission may have been to test Washington’s responses to its presence. It is not certain that Chinese leader Xi Jinping was aware of the balloon flight. But Xi’s increasingly hawkish tendencies toward the U.S. (the degree of which is significantly underestimated by many Western analysts) mean that it is probable. Regardless, at least elements of the Central Military Commission would see this balloon flight as a means of assessing the Biden administration’s response in two key areas.

The first one is whether the administration publicized the balloon’s owner and purpose to the public, and the second one is its response to the balloon’s incursion. These responses will help guide Chinese strategy in its engagement with the U.S. on other sensitive topics such as Taiwan. Indeed, the Biden administration’s decision to shoot down the balloon was likely at least partly motivated by a fear that doing otherwise would signal risk aversion to Beijing. While there were legitimate concerns over civilian risks related to downing the balloon over the ground, the Biden administration may have propagated that risk aversion concern by waiting to down the balloon until it was over water.

Top line: The U.S. reaction to this flight might be deeply detrimental to Beijing’s diplomacy. Nevertheless, centered on its expectation of near-term conflict, China had a number of ominous motives for last week’s excursion.

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