On the 2024 campaign trail, President Donald Trump repeatedly vowed to end the war in Ukraine on “Day One” of his second administration.
More than 100 days later, the war rages on. The president has since said his pledge was exaggerated and made “in jest,” arguing that three months isn’t so long in a three-year war. The Trump administration’s efforts to end the war have seen the U.S.’s position regarding Ukraine shift dramatically, with negotiations playing a major role in upending the global order.
While Trump’s handling of negotiations has its fair share of defenders and critics, most agree that his approach has reshaped the U.S.’s position in the world, for better or worse.

Negotiation progress
After his inauguration on Jan. 20, Trump quickly signaled that the Biden administration’s position of portraying the conflict as an essential moral crusade was over. He opened direct talks with the Kremlin, scaled back U.S. aid to Ukraine, and began speaking of the U.S. position regarding Ukraine more transactionally, aiming to get a return on the tens of billions of dollars given in aid.
On Feb. 12, Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held an hour-and-a-half-long phone call, the first conversation between the heads of state of Russia and the United States since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Trump described the phone call as “highly productive” in a post on Truth Social, with a praiseworthy tone that marked a warming of relations with the Kremlin. The president directed Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Director of the CIA John Ratcliffe, former national security adviser Mike Waltz, and Ambassador and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to lead negotiations to end the war.
The phone call and ensuing negotiations quickly became a sore point between the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine. The latter two retained the absolutist moral vision that had characterized Western stances at the beginning of the war, clashing with the U.S.’s new position. The Trump administration ruled out Ukraine’s admission to NATO and U.S.-backed security guarantees, seeking instead to link the U.S. to Ukraine through economic investments, mainly through a deal that would give Washington access to the country’s rare earth minerals.
Plans for the mineral deal culminated in an explosive Feb. 28 Oval Office meeting among Trump, Zelensky, and Vice President JD Vance. The public portion of the meeting escalated into a shouting match, ending in Zelensky being kicked out of the White House without a mineral deal being signed. Allies had to work behind the scenes to mend relations after the U.S. cut off intelligence sharing and all aid to Ukraine. Though their relationship improved somewhat, it has remained tense. Trump and Zelensky briefly met at Pope Francis’s funeral last week.
The last month of Trump’s first 100 days was characterized by a seesaw of blame, with the president expressing alternating between directing his public outrage at Putin and Zelensky. High-profile meetings between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine have drawn up ceasefire plans, but mutually exclusive positions have prevented a breakthrough.
Russia-Ukraine peace report card: C
Experts are divided on the progress of negotiations, especially due to their secretive nature. Frank Gaffney, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under President Ronald Reagan and President of the Institute for the American Future, told the Washington Examiner that a comprehensive analysis of negotiations is difficult as the deliberations are “mostly obscured from public eye.”
“My sense is that there’s a lot of heat, not much light. I think that the posturing of the various parties in these negotiations, I’m speaking particularly the foreign ones, obviously has made it very difficult to assess, and I think the administration would acknowledge this,” he said, adding that the administration seems to be “evolving as it has interacted with the various parties.”
Clifford May, founder and President of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, was less charitable in his initial assessment.
“You can’t say they’ve gone well since Putin is still attacking civilians with missiles and drones,” he said of the negotiations generally.
However, May argued that Trump’s recent public lashings out against Putin appear to be more lasting than those against Zelensky, signaling a wider shift in policy.
“I do think what needs to happen now, and I’m encouraged and hoping that President Trump is recognizing this … that the only way to get Putin to agree to a ceasefire, which I think President Trump wants, is to put some serious pressure on Putin. He’s put serious pressure on Zelensky,” May said. “He hasn’t put serious pressure on Putin, yet he can do so. He mentioned himself the possibility of secondary sanctions.”
Gaffney argued that Trump’s frequent changes in attitude regarding whether he’s more angry with Zelensky or Putin are largely irrelevant, as the truly important factors in a peace deal aren’t tactical but strategic.
“The strategic [question] is, ‘Is there a basis for a deal that would actually end Vladimir Putin’s ambitions, not just towards Ukraine, but towards potential other targets of opportunity, as he sees it?’ And if the answer to that is, at best, ‘it’s not clear,’ and at worst, ‘very, very low likelihood,’ then that’s got to be a source of overarching frustration for Trump, because he doesn’t just want a deal. He wants the end of this war. And ostensibly, others do as well, but not as much as he wants it, it seems,” he said.
One of the most promising developments from negotiations is the first real discussion of a ceasefire. Moscow and Kyiv haven’t even entertained the idea of a ceasefire since the opening months of the conflict, with both viewing total victory as the only possibility. The beginning of the Trump administration has seen both sides begin to entertain the prospect of both limited and total ceasefires publicly.
Gaffney speculated that this development might not be a major marker of peace but rather posturing from the belligerents. Zelensky and Putin, he contended, are primarily concerned with being viewed by Trump as a constructive party in peace negotiations.
“I’m not sure that we’ve seen anything, yet, that events is an actual bottom line from Putin or, for that matter, Zelensky,” Gaffney said. “I think they’ve clearly decided that they want to be seen as constructive, and not simply impeding some kind of negotiated outcome here. But it’s not clear to me, particularly on the part of the Russians, that that’s anything other than just buying time to continue mopping up what it can.”
May views the goal of a ceasefire as worthwhile for the time being, using two examples in which the U.S. can operate.
“The Korean War never ended. It’s been simply frozen, put on ice for about 53 years. And over those 53 years, what’s happened? Well, South Korea has evolved … into a democratic and prosperous American ally. North Korea remains what it’s been, a hell hole, anti-American, and closely aligned at this point with Moscow, with Beijing, and with Tehran,” he said.
May cited the Soviet annexation of Lithuania and the Baltic countries as an example of dealing with territory.
“The U.S. never recognized [the annexation] as legitimate. That was helpful because when the Soviet Union collapsed, those countries could emerge quickly and easily with U.S. recognition as independent countries,” May said.
A ceasefire is particularly difficult due to a lack of trust from both parties. Moscow and Kyiv fear a ceasefire would allow the other side to “rearm and regroup and then renew the war on more favorable terms.” This mutual concern makes it “very, very difficult to take seriously” talks of a ceasefire, Gaffney argued.
When pressed to give a report card score of Trump’s handling of the Ukraine War, Gaffney declined to answer. He argued that due to the secretive nature of negotiations and the relatively little time that has passed, a fair report card grading is “impossible at the moment.”
May gave a “gentleman’s C,” crediting Trump’s evolving position while noting the lack of an imminent peace deal in the conflict.
“Part of it is that we haven’t finished this semester. We need to get to the mid-term examination, and I’ve got to read the term papers before I can give a grade. But I understand it’s 100 days … so let me just say this: I’m happy to revise the grade as before the end of the semester,” he said.
Handling of European alliances: B
One of the biggest changes brought about by Trump has been his new approach to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S.’s European allies. After Vance’s Munich speech in February, where he criticized European allies for not pulling their weight in defense spending, some European leaders and analysts spoke of the end of U.S. influence and the possibility of Europe turning away from the U.S. entirely. This argument was backed up by the European Union’s announcement of a major military spending plan and individual announcements from major European powers such as Germany.
However, May and Gaffney dismissed this prospect, viewing it as mere rhetoric from the Europeans. Both said the EU can’t stand on its own and has nowhere else to go.
“Color me skeptical of all of this thrashing about by NATO. The truth of the matter is, NATO’s got nowhere else to go. They have to rely on the United States to be an ally and ultimately an essential element of their national defense,” Gaffney said.
“I don’t think serious people in Europe think that cozying up to the Chinese, or participating in their belt Road Initiative, or making themselves more dependent on the Chinese, whether it’s for export markets or whether it’s for imports or whether it’s for critical supply chains, is actually a good idea. I just find it hard to believe that that’s a widespread belief, even among elites in European countries,” he added, saying that Europeans would be “crazy” to ally themselves with China over the U.S.
He dismissed talks of Trump signaling the end of American influence in Europe as “histrionics.”
May echoed similar sentiments, saying it would take decades and a major turnaround in policy for Europe to contemplate supplanting the U.S.’s position as “leader of the free world.”
“There is no European power, or collection of European powers, that can take the leadership in a real way over the near term — 10 years from now, 20 years from now, who knows? I still think America is absolutely indispensable for the future of Europe and for the future of free nations everywhere,” he said.
“Europe is not prepared, at this point, to stand on its own without America. It’s just not realistic,” May continued. “If you, if you’re spending 1.5% of your GDP on defense, and you need to be spending 3%, 4%, 5% … that’s a good goal. But you can’t achieve it over the next six months, or even over the next year. You can’t do it, and there’s a lot of restructuring you have to do financially, militarily, and other ways to get up to where you need to be and to have the defense industrial base that you don’t have.”
With talks of decoupling from the U.S. deemed unrealistic, Gaffney and May largely praised the president’s tough handling of his European allies.
“I do think that what Trump has shown himself capable of doing … I guess the colloquial expression would be ’tough love,’ is getting these guys braced up. And I think that will wind up being to our mutual benefit,” Gaffney said.
He said the U.S.’s European allies “know that they’re dealing with a very formidable leader of a very powerful nation, and I think at the end of the day, they’re going to realize that that’s the side they want to be on, not the side of our enemies.”
100-DAY REPORT CARD: TRUMP TACKLES BORDER BUT HITS SETBACKS ON DEPORTING IMMIGRANTS
Gaffney and May also dismissed the characterization that Trump had fundamentally changed the U.S.-led order, characterizing his overhaul of U.S. alliances as a “reworking” rather than a revolution.
While Gaffney declined to give a letter grade once again, May gave Trump a “B” on his handling of Europe, NATO, and the EU, with the same caveat that the grade could change after further developments.