News of the Russian capture of Avdiivka and a subsequent Russian advance in Ukraine has increased concerns about Ukraine’s prospects in its war with Russia.
It is tempting to rely on movement along the battle lines as an indicator of relative success. Yet, victory is unlikely to be decided by the ebb and flow of territory. The real test is what the side that is capturing a town pays in lives and treasure. Just because someone “bought” something, that does not mean they made a wise purchase. Russia may even be experiencing buyer’s regret.
Most often, winning a war consists of convincing the enemy that it is destined to lose. This can happen on the ground, by capturing territory, or when one side cannot supply its forces in the field. But typically, defeat is psychological, forming in the minds of leaders and populations.
This might sound confusing. Surely, the Russo-Ukrainian war is about territory. Both sides have defined their political objectives in terms of maps — Ukraine seeks a return to its 1991 borders, while Moscow annexed four Ukrainian oblasts, none of which it completely controls.
The war is indeed about territory, but it won’t be decided or resolved by control of territory. To see why, imagine for a moment that Ukraine’s offensive had been phenomenally successful. Let us suppose that Ukrainian troops pushed all Russian forces completely out of the country.
Would that have ended the war? Would Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledge defeat and sue for peace? This seems unlikely, particularly given that Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders are well within Russia’s claimed territory. Indeed, according to the Russian version of events, Ukraine is already fighting within Russia. In other words, nothing will have changed for Russia’s leaders.
If Russia will not quit the war once Ukraine reaches its stated objectives, how can this conflict end? It is hardly plausible to suggest that Ukraine can march on Moscow. In fact, there is no practical territorial objective that Ukraine can conquer that would force Russia to quit the war.
By the same token, it is extremely unlikely that Russia will be able to subdue the vast expanses of Ukrainian territory, having failed to do so in its initial assault in the spring of 2022.
Thus, while the war is over territory, it won’t be decided by any given disposition of territory — the winner will not be the one that captures more land. Instead, it will be the side that can sustain itself on the battlefield, the side that is most willing and able to continue the fight.
This is called a war of attrition. Amateurs talk tactics, and professionals talk logistics, it is said. All wars involve logistics, but wars of attrition hinge in particular on which side can sustain troops and materiel on the front and maintain public support for the war at home, among the public.
Wars vary in terms of means and ends. Adversaries can fight over stuff, tangible things that they can take and hold against others, whether “the other” likes it or not, or prerogatives, intangibles that generally always require at least tacit acquiescence on the part of the enemy.
Ends often determine means. Typically, if one wants a prerogative from someone else that one cannot physically take, coercion must be used, “punishing” — harming or threatening to harm — an adversary until it agrees to hand over outcomes one desires but cannot just take.
In contrast, one can physically take or hold tangible assets. If I want a gold watch that belongs to someone else, I can steal it, whether its owner agrees to let me have it or not.
However, sometimes it is easier to use or threaten punishment, even for tangible goods. The memorable phrase “your money or your life” implies a quid pro quo punishment to acquire a tangible good — money. The mugger could just kill you upfront and rifle through your pockets.
Punishment can thus be pursued, even for tangible goods, when physically taking something is difficult, costly, or impractical. Both sides in the Ukraine war have reached this conclusion. Each now seeks to wear down the enemy, to convince them to accept defeat, rather than force surrender directly.
This also poses a peculiar feature of the conflict. Wars of attrition can be won either by attacking supply or demand, increasing the availability of soldiers, bullets, and bombs, or by reducing one’s own “spend” of limited resources. Particularly for the defender or the weaker side, the smart thing to do is to hunker down and make the other side engage in costly, fruitless attacks.
Germany did this in World War I. Allied assaults almost handed Germany a victory. The French army mutinied in the trenches in 1917. Morale in the British Expeditionary Force similarly plummeted in 1917 after extraordinary casualties incurred during the Battle of the Somme.
Fortunately for the Allies, Germany ran out of time. Britain blockaded German ports, causing food scarcity. The United States also entered the war in late 1917. German soldiers had to get out of their trenches and attack, experiencing the same decimation inflicted on Allied soldiers.
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
Russian commanders are hurling their troops at Ukrainian defenses in costly attacks. Ukrainian commanders can let the enemy make such mistakes if Ukraine remains more patient and optimistic. As long as Russia feels compelled to go on the offensive, the outlook for Ukraine actually looks reasonably good.
In a war of attrition, the side that is taking territory is not necessarily winning. By supplying Ukraine with the means to fight, Western countries sustain Ukrainian optimism and patience. At the same time, economic sanctions and other measures force Moscow to be time-sensitive — each day at war is another nail in the coffin of the Russian economy. This is a reasonable middle ground between direct involvement and indifference. Ukraine and Russia will determine which side is more resolved to sustain the fight. It will not be territory that determines the outcome.
Erik Gartzke is a professor of political science and director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California at San Diego.