Attending the Munich Security Conference in Germany last weekend, Sen. J.D. Vance (R-OH) explained why he believes the United States should resist new aid provisions to Ukraine.
Vance was nuanced and well spoken, something that seemed to shock the Munich audience. He unequivocally condemned Russian President Vladimir Putin for the killing of Alexei Navalny (the refusal to hand over the body to Navalny’s family points strongly to poisoning). And when it came to Ukraine, Vance’s argument was not that Ukraine doesn’t deserve support but rather that the U.S. must pivot to Asia because its military resources exist in a “world of scarcity.” What Vance is really talking about here is the U.S.’s need to maximize its readiness for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or an attack on U.S.-treaty ally the Philippines.
What to make of this world of scarcity argument?
Well, while I believe the U.S. should provide significantly less financial aid to Ukraine than does the EU, I disagree that the U.S. should withhold all financial aid, munitions, and weapons systems from Ukraine. Ukraine’s ability to force a Russian concessionary peace represents an important U.S. strategic interest. Ukraine’s evolution to a defense-in-depth plus deep strike strategy will also reduce its munition demands. I also believe that munitions deliveries can be triaged to prioritize U.S.-Taiwan defensive needs while also supporting Ukraine.
Nevertheless, as Elbridge Colby has outlined repeatedly and as the mathematical facts prove, Vance is undeniably correct when he says that the U.S. cannot provide maximal support to Ukraine, to Israel, and simultaneously hold readiness for contingencies in the Pacific. U.S. readiness for a war with China is already highly problematic. Fixing that problem in today’s world thus means the U.S. cannot do everything it wants everywhere without accepting the unacceptable risk of defeat in the coming China war. My view is that this war is a question of when, not if (although Taiwan’s failure to take its defense seriously undermines the U.S.’s political rationale to defend it).
That said, Vance’s key argument that Europe must urgently do more for Ukraine and for its own defense should not be a controversial one. To accept the contravening foreign policy and media establishment consensus that Europe is already doing its fair share in Ukraine and NATO’s defense, and that the U.S. is failing to do so, one must first accept three contentions.
First, that four European Union member states do in fact not border Ukraine. Second, that European governments aren’t simply now increasing defense spending and strengthening their defense industrial bases but are engaged in crash programs to do so. Third, that the Europeans are actually delivering – especially in terms of munitions – that which they have already pledged to Ukraine.
None of these contentions is true.
Four EU states border Ukraine, making Putin’s war an exigent threat to the European political project. And while some European states are increasing defense spending in a credible fashion, they are not doing so on the necessary crisis-rush basis. Indeed, some European states such as Spain, Italy, and Belgium continue to treat defense spending as an unaffordable luxury. Others that have the economic power to improve their defense capabilities rapidly are only doing so with calculated lethargy. Making matters worse, even German-funded assessments indicate that, unlike the U.S., many European states have not provided to Ukraine the budgetary support that they have pledged. Tellingly, these media-preferred statistics do not appear to include the difference between EU munitions/defense pledges and actual EU deliveries. Perhaps because the European Union has utterly failed to meet its commitments? No worries, however. The EU foreign policy chief says it should be congratulated for its failure. Such delusion underlines the urgency of Vance’s central argument.
Moreover, all of this comes in addition to Europe’s continued excess reliance on the U.S. military in NATO’s defense. This is particularly true about U.S. Army heavy maneuver and rapid reaction forces, U.S. Air Force intelligence and refueling aircraft, and U.S. Navy destroyers and submarines.
Do not misunderstand me. The U.S. should respond with decisive force to any Russian attack on our Russia-bordering NATO allies: the Baltic states, Poland, Norway, and Finland (contrary to his recent lies, Putin has ambitions against Estonia). This should include the use of strategic nuclear forces if necessary. And on that note, American conservatives must also be honest about who are and who are not good allies in Europe. Heritage Foundation President Kevin Roberts is very positive about Hungary’s Viktor Orban, for example, even though Orban obstructs greater EU aid for Ukraine (which would relieve aid pressure on the U.S.) and is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s best friend in Europe.
Yet the key point here is that the EU remains generally unserious about collective defense and protecting shared values. After all, it is striking that Russia-bordering NATO allies lead the way on exceeding the alliance’s 2%-of-GDP defense spending baseline. NATO figures show that many others loiter around or below 1.5%-of-GDP defense spending. This is plainly unacceptable. And how can we ignore the rampant kowtowing of the EU big two, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, to China (sorry, sending a warship through the South China Sea every two years doesn’t count as deterrence boosting)? Is this not proof positive that key U.S. allies don’t exactly have its back in the Pacific in the same way they demand the U.S. do more in Europe? Again, the U.S. should support Ukraine, including with some munitions and weapon systems. But the EU must do far, far more. And it must do so far more urgently.
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Some U.S. allies get it. Joining Vance on the Munich stage was the United Kingdom Labour Party opposition’s Foreign Ministry lead, David Lammy. Lammy isn’t exactly a Vance-style conservative. Not by a long shot. Still, he was strident in articulating the importance of Britain’s 2%-of-GDP defense commitments and the need for Europe to do far more, far faster. Labour is very likely to form a government later this year. The party appears to recognize that European NATO allies must put their money and munitions where their mouths are if the alliance is to remain credible.
Unfortunately, many other allies are clearly not yet there. And in their delusional whining over American support for Ukraine, they only ultimately undermine their own and our common collective security.