The US can’t defend Taiwan without Taiwan

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Communist China plans to invade Taiwan, potentially sparking a devastating Sino-American war. But successfully repelling a Chinese invasion requires more than just U.S. involvement. Taiwan itself is key to defending its own sovereignty. And a successful defense of Taiwan will necessitate Taipei making changes — and fast.

Xi Jinping is preparing China for war. In his annual New Year’s Eve address, the CCP head once again vowed to seize Taiwan, warning that “the motherland will surely be reunited.” China’s actions match Xi’s rhetoric.

In 2023, the Chinese government announced a 7.2% increase in China’s defense budget, which had already doubled over the last decade. Matt Pottinger, a former U.S. deputy national security adviser, and John Pomfret, a longtime China-watcher and distinguished journalist, have pointed out that China is working to reduce its dependency on foreign grain imports, enacting new military readiness laws, and building or upgrading new air-raid shelters and wartime emergency hospitals.

Taiwan’s minister of national defense, Chiu Kuo-cheng, has warned that China will have the ability to mount a “full-scale” invasion by 2025. But questions loom about Taiwan’s preparedness.

In 2023, the Taiwanese government announced plans to increase defense spending to the equivalent of $19.1 billion dollars. Yet this figure is only a 3.5% increase over the previous year’s budget. And it constitutes a mere 2.6% of the nation’s GDP. 

By contrast, both Poland and Israel have massively increased their own defense budgets, accounting for 4% and 6% of their respective GDPs. Both countries face threats from Russia and Iran — nations whose military and economic power pale in comparison to China’s. And unlike Taipei, neither Warsaw nor Jerusalem is facing an invasion that would potentially cut off lines of resupply. Should China invade the island nation, there is a very real chance that resupply from the U.S. and allies would be difficult, if not impossible. 

Taiwanese officials have noted that the country has “consistently increased its defense budget over the past few years, spending a greater proportion of its GDP on the military than most NATO member states.” This is true. But it remains insufficient given the scope and scale of the threat posed by China. Nor should free-riding NATO member states like Germany be viewed as a model for defense spending. 

Public opinion polls show that a clear majority of Taiwanese are willing to fight should China use force to achieve unification. And Taiwanese should have a good idea of what their future would look like under Beijing. China’s repression of democratic forces in Hong Kong offers a clear indicator of what would happen to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy. But popular opinion will not defeat China’s People’s Liberation Army. Hard power alone can do that. And here, too, there is cause for concern.

For years, Taiwan eschewed investing in coastal defense and asymmetric capabilities, preferring to spend considerable sums on costly weapons platforms that would easily be outclassed by China. If belatedly, Taiwan has reversed course. Yet, the scope and scale are insufficient. Both urgency and drastic changes are required to deter, and if necessary, defend Taiwan.

A Sino-American conflict would be the most devastating war to confront the world in eight decades. Taiwan is a vital partner, its importance extending beyond semiconductors and democracy; should Taiwan fall, America’s position in both the Indo-Pacific and the world itself would be severely affected. But by any metric, a successful defense of Taiwan hinges on the Taiwanese themselves.

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The writer is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign affairs analyst. His views are his own.

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