Negotiating teams from Russia, Ukraine, and the United States concluded two days of talks in the United Arab Emirates on Wednesday with an agreement on prisoner exchanges and a pledge to meet again. But that’s it. The next meeting is unlikely to produce more. Why?
Simple. Russia’s war aims in Ukraine remain unchanged.
The Kremlin seeks a Ukraine that is politically subordinated to Russia. Moscow doesn’t care if this is achieved through military conquest or through political arrangements, only that it happens. In practice, this means a Ukraine with a small army and no Western security guarantees of substance. It also means Ukraine being pushed back from the fortified lines in the Donbas that have stalled Russian offensives. The Kremlin hopes that these peace talks can accomplish around a table what Russian forces have lost nearly 500,000 soldiers, failing to secure on the battlefield.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offers a more realistic approach. He supports an immediate ceasefire along the current front line, but Russia says no. Moscow’s demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the part of Donetsk region still under Kyiv’s control is part of that strategy. The territory is the most heavily fortified sector of the front, a defensive belt. Surrendering the remaining Donbas would mean Ukraine’s sacrificing its strongest defenses in exchange for vague promises. It would leave the Ukrainian army to defend open ground against the next attack. It would demoralize soldiers who have paid dearly to hold that land, and weaken any government that agreed to it.
In turn, a concession of this magnitude could make sense only in return for a guarantee strong enough to make the next war impossible, something close to NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense arrangement. In the absence of that promise, it makes no sense for Kyiv to accede to Moscow.
Such a guarantee, whether a direct American commitment or an Article 5-style pledge, would also need U.S. troops on Ukrainian soil or at least close by in Poland. A formal commitment defined only by rhetoric and a few European soldiers leaves room for hesitation. History shows the room can quickly be widened. In 1939, the United Kingdom and France went to war after Nazi Germany attacked Poland, a country whose security they had guaranteed. During the “Phoney War” that followed, however, their armies stayed largely idle while Poland was overrun. Real fighting began only in May 1940, when Germany attacked France directly.
But history also offers a guide as to how security guarantees can work. Consider the status of West Germany during the Cold War. American and NATO troops stationed on its soil meant that Moscow had to assume crossing the border meant fighting the entirety of NATO. Moscow could have trampled these “tripwire” forces in short order but held back from doing so in fear of sparking World War III. That fear kept the peace, sustained West German democracy, and ultimately led to a peaceful German reunification. Put simply, Russia must know that any future attack on Ukraine would simultaneously be an attack on European powers and the U.S..
Ukraine’s fear that any guarantees will be weak and insufficient is credible. Washington’s policy toward the pro-Western democracy has been marked by hesitation since 2014. It’s a story of defensive weapons that arrived late, sporadically, and in limited quantities. To secure a lasting peace, Ukraine and Russia must both know that the moment Vladimir Putin or a future Russian leader restarts the war, Western militaries — with an American military backstop — will join the fight.
Of course, Moscow’s opposition to such serious security guarantees demonstrates the lie of its stated commitment to peace. Russian officials maintain that their country seeks a durable settlement and intends to live peacefully alongside Ukraine. An Article 5-style guarantee would be fully consistent with that position. Such a commitment takes effect only in the event of aggression. A state prepared to respect a neighboring state’s sovereignty would have no reason to object. The intensity of the Kremlin’s resistance points to a different calculation.
Moscow wants to preserve the option to use force again and keep that threat hanging over Kyiv’s political choices. It wants Ukrainians to know they will remain secure only so long as they obey Russian diktats. A settlement on those terms would be the chronicle of a war foretold.
No free and self-respecting nation, let alone one that has bled so much and so bravely, could agree to it.