Everyone wants the war in Ukraine to end. President Donald Trump has made that his goal from Day One. But ending the fighting and protecting American interests are different things. Recent developments made that clear.
On Oct. 9, Trump announced a deal to lift sanctions on Russian diesel, allowing it to reach American and global markets and help stabilize prices. A U.S. official said the move followed repeated requests from Washington for Kyiv to stop attacking Russian oil refineries, which Kyiv had ignored. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the deal “not fair and not honest.” Trump responded: “I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal. … I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president.”
Some Ukrainians agree.
Vadym Novynskyi, once one of Ukraine’s wealthiest industrialists and a member of parliament, called on Zelensky to resign and transfer power to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, less than a day before Trump’s remarks. He wants direct negotiations with Russia “anywhere in the world, including Moscow,” and “without intermediaries, without preconditions.”
Novynskyi points out that 73% of Ukrainian voters elected Zelensky in 2019, largely on his promise of peace. He says he helped organize the Istanbul negotiations in spring 2022, which he recalls as moving toward compromises before collapsing.
“Zelensky chose the path of war,” Novynskyi wrote. “We must realize that now any peace terms will be more difficult for Ukraine than those proposed in Istanbul.” Novynskyi argued that Ukraine has paid for the failed Istanbul negotiations by losing millions of its citizens, thousands of square kilometers of territory, and entire sectors of its economy – “these are all irreversible losses that will have profound consequences for the future of our people.”
Kyiv sees Novynskyi differently. In December 2022, Ukraine imposed sanctions on him, froze his business holdings, and charged him with treason in January 2025. His supporters call it punishment for advocating peace and trying to defend the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church from political persecution over its historic ties with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Whatever one thinks of Novynskyi, his argument raises uncomfortable questions: How much longer can Ukraine fight, and will the terms of an eventual settlement become worse?
Washington faces its own question: What must a peace agreement accomplish before Americans can say they are safer and better off?
A ceasefire alone won’t do it.
First comes the danger of a wider war. America cannot afford a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. That would put American troops and possibly the homeland at risk. Washington need not guarantee Ukraine’s security indefinitely, but any agreement must discourage another Russian attack. A ceasefire that simply gives both armies time to regroup solves little.
Then there is Europe. NATO allies agreed last year to work toward spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense and related security needs by 2035. Fine. But spending targets don’t stop tanks. Europe needs ammunition, air defenses, and forces it can deploy. Americans shouldn’t have to finance another indefinite commitment while Europe’s promises remain on paper.
Sanctions are another test. The diesel agreement illustrates the trade-off. Easing restrictions may stabilize energy markets and bring Moscow toward negotiations. But what does Washington get in return? What happens if Moscow breaks its commitments? Sanctions relief is leverage, and giving it away without enforceable concessions would be a mistake.
America also has other priorities. China remains its most serious long-term strategic challenge. The Indo-Pacific needs weapons, intelligence, and diplomatic attention, resources currently devoted in part to Europe. A settlement should allow Washington to redirect some of that capacity.
Then there is a huge economic opportunity. Kirill Dmitriev, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s investment envoy, has put the possible value of joint U.S.-Russia projects at more than $14 trillion. That figure is highly speculative, but the opportunities are real. American and Russian officials have discussed cooperation in Arctic oil and gas, critical minerals, and even bringing U.S. investors into the Nord Stream gas pipelines. Washington also has a minerals and reconstruction agreement with Kyiv. It’s not just about what America stops spending, but what it could gain.
Any peace deal must be acceptable to those expected to implement it. That’s why Ukraine’s internal political debate matters. Whoever negotiates must have the authority and support to make the deal stick.
This won’t be easy. Both Ukraine and Russia have suffered enormous losses, and neither side will get everything it wants. Painful compromises are unavoidable. Some disputes may remain unresolved for years.
During the Biden administration, Congress approved roughly $175 billion to support Ukraine while managing the risk of confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia. The public deserves to know what comes next. Will Europe defend itself? Will American commitments become more limited? Will another war become less likely? Can Washington focus more on China and benefit economically from peace?
Those questions matter more than photographs of a signing ceremony.
TRUMP’S TIME TO STRIKE AN IRAN DEAL IS RUNNING OUT
Trump is right to seek an end to the war. But America needs more than a temporary halt to the shooting. It needs a settlement that reduces American exposure, makes Europe responsible for its defense, and gives Moscow clear incentives to honor its commitments. Russia must have a stake in preserving peace, while the costs of restarting the war must outweigh any possible gains.
Otherwise, Washington may celebrate peace today and pay for another war tomorrow.
Duggan Flanakin is a CFACT policy analyst.