The most dangerous Chinese technologies don’t look like weapons. A cellular module the size of a quarter, buried inside a larger machine. A robot dog built for search and rescue. Biotech research aimed at lifesaving cures. Beijing is turning all of them into instruments of military power. U.S. national security policy must catch up.
Cellular modules, advanced robotics, and biotechnology serve very different purposes, but they expose the same problem. While China has become adept at turning emerging technology into military advantage, many U.S. national security tools were built for a world where the line between commercial and military technology was clearer.
Beijing’s military-civil fusion strategy is designed to blur that line. Civilian companies, researchers, and supply chains all contribute to the People’s Liberation Army’s modernization. We know how to scrutinize a Chinese missile or fighter jet. We don’t buy or sell Chinese military goods. The harder question, however, is what to do when potentially sensitive technology is already inside an American network, sold as an inexpensive commercial robot, or emerging from a legitimate biotechnology partnership.
To counter this growing threat, I put forward three provisions in the House’s annual defense bill — and am advancing the ideas as stand-alone legislation — to tackle different aspects of the problem.
Start with cellular modules. These small components allow larger devices to connect to 4G and 5G networks. They can be found inside routers, vehicles, sensors, industrial equipment, and other connected devices.
Their ubiquity is part of the problem. Chinese firms are major suppliers of these components. As research on cellular modules has explained, manufacturers can retain remote access for functions such as firmware updates. With that, Beijing may be able to disrupt normal operations at the time of its choosing. A module buried inside a larger piece of equipment is a cybersecurity risk waiting to detonate.
But the Pentagon can’t mitigate a risk it doesn’t see. My legislation would require the War Department to audit its infrastructure for Chinese-made cellular modules, prioritizing systems important to military mobility, logistics, and installation security. The Pentagon would also be required to examine contractor-operated infrastructure connected to Pentagon systems and assess risks involving data flows, network exposure, and remote access.
In plain English: find the devices, determine which ones create real risks, and decide what needs to be isolated, repaired, or replaced.
Meanwhile, China has built a large commercial robotics industry, and the PLA is drawing from that ecosystem. China’s military is using “robotic wolves” and sensors that help autonomous systems navigate and operate, accelerating its military capabilities. The logical target: contested waters and urban terrain that the PLA would need to navigate to take over Taiwan.
When an adversary’s commercial and military ecosystems increasingly overlap, the Pentagon should not deepen its dependence on companies and technologies contributing to that adversary’s military capabilities.
I have therefore proposed legislation to prohibit the War Department from procuring covered Chinese robotic systems and phase out their use in sensitive operational environments. It covers Chinese-produced quadrupeds, unmanned ground vehicles, and light detection and ranging sensors that act as advanced radar systems.
The third challenge may be the hardest to overcome, as it carries the greatest potential for advances in civil society.
Gene editing, synthetic biology, and bioinformatics can produce medical breakthroughs and save lives, but those same technologies can also have military applications. The answer is not to treat biotechnology itself as a threat. Instead, U.S. defense and intelligence agencies must understand how China could use advances in the field for military modernization before Washington is forced to play catch-up.
The War Department should incorporate foreign biotechnology threats into defense planning. The intelligence community should assess China’s use of biotechnology for military purposes, including gene editing, synthetic biology, bioinformatics, and military-civil fusion. My legislation requires just that.
It would also create an interagency mechanism to examine Chinese investments, partnerships, and joint ventures in the U.S. biotechnology sector, including risks involving sensitive technology, intellectual property, and genomic data.
The logic behind these measures is simple: find out what’s already in sensitive systems, stop buying technology that creates avoidable risk, and treat emerging dual-use fields as security issues before they become military surprises.
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For too long, we have treated commercial and military technology as separate worlds. Beijing does not. Its strategy depends on exploiting the space between them.
The next decisive advantage may not arrive as a warship or a missile. It may be a tiny communications component, a cheap robot, or a scientific breakthrough. If U.S. policy waits until the threat is obvious, the supply chains will already belong to our adversaries.
Rep. Sheri Biggs, a Republican, serves the people of South Carolina’s 3rd Congressional District.