What matters most to Kim Jong Un: A powerful military or a military that remains loyal to him?
North Korea has treated its military as a central pillar of the regime for decades. It has developed nuclear weapons and missiles, expanded military cooperation with Russia, and increased its military influence on the Korean Peninsula. But a series of developments inside North Korea in 2026 points to another concern. For the leadership in Pyongyang, maintaining the military’s political loyalty and organizational control may be just as important as strengthening its combat capabilities.
In July, Kim held an unusual meeting attended by senior officials from the party, government, and military, where he publicly criticized corruption within the armed forces. At the center of the case was Pak Hui Chol, a former deputy director of the Organization Department of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army. North Korean state media accused Pak of abusing his authority, accepting bribes, and using his position for personal gain. Kim described the case not simply as an individual act of misconduct, but as a serious violation of the anti-corruption campaign being pursued by the Workers’ Party of Korea.
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The important point is that Pak was not simply a military officer. The General Political Bureau is one of the key institutions through which the Workers’ Party controls the military. Its Organization Department has played a significant role in managing political officers, party affairs, personnel appointments, and political reporting within the armed forces. According to 38 North, the department’s influence extended beyond personnel assignments and promotions to aspects of military resources and administration.
That raises a fundamental question: What happens when an organization created to control the military becomes a channel through which power and resources inside the military can be exploited? The deeper problem may not have been the money itself. If military positions can be bought, reports manipulated, and problems prevented from reaching the leadership, a leader can no longer be certain that the organization he believes he controls accurately reflects what is happening on the ground.
In an authoritarian system, that can be more dangerous than corruption alone. In a democratic state, military power is subject to multiple layers of oversight through constitutional rules, laws, legislatures, and courts. North Korea is fundamentally different. The Workers’ Party directly controls the military, while the political-officer system is designed to manage political loyalty within the armed forces. If that system of party control fails, the leadership risks losing reliable information and control over the very personnel system on which it depends.
Personnel changes among senior military officials followed the Pak case. In August, North Korea reshuffled several senior military positions, including the defense minister. Kim Song Gi, formerly a senior official in the General Political Bureau, was appointed defense minister. Pak Jong Chon moved to the position of vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, while other senior officials in the military security and political apparatus were also reassigned. 38 North has suggested that these changes may reflect an effort by the party leadership to restore political control over the military following the problems exposed by the Pak Hui Chol case.
And the process does not appear to have ended there.
On Oct. 3, Daily NK reported that investigations following the Pak case were expanding into the political departments of the North Korean military. Political officers at the headquarters of the Eighth Corps in North Pyongan Province were reportedly subjected to inspections, transfers, and early-discharge orders, with similar measures extending to political officers in subordinate divisions, brigades, and battalions. Political departments are also reported to wield considerable influence over promotions and disciplinary actions within the military.
What does this mean?
It would be too strong to conclude that Kim distrusts the entire military. North Korea’s military buildup remains one of the regime’s central priorities, and the armed forces remain one of the most important pillars of Kim’s power. But that is precisely why uncontrolled networks of influence within the military may be particularly sensitive for Kim.
A strong military is necessary. But from a leader’s perspective, a strong military and a powerful military establishment are not necessarily the same thing. The military’s capabilities provide the state with power. But the institutional influence of the military leadership is also a political variable that a leader must constantly manage. In nuclear-armed North Korea, any instability in the military’s chain of command, political loyalty, or personnel system is not merely an organizational problem. It can directly connect regime security with national security.
That may be why the most important question in the Pak case is not simply how corrupt one official was. The more important questions are: Why did North Korean leaders conclude that such abuses were possible within an organization created to control the military? And what answer is Kim Jong Un giving himself?
North Korea’s military power continues to grow in 2026. At the same time, Kim Jong Un appears to be tightening and reorganizing the political mechanisms through which he controls the military.
These developments are not necessarily contradictory.
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In fact, the stronger the military becomes, the more important it may be to determine who controls that power and how.
For Kim, the goal may not simply be to maintain a powerful military. It may be to maintain a powerful military that he can control to the very end.
Park Joonhye is a research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. She holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics and Unification Studies from the University of North Korean Studies. Her research focuses on North Korean politics, nuclear policy, society and culture, and unification discourse. She has published peer-reviewed research and writes regularly on North Korea and Northeast Asian security.