The Russia-Ukraine war has reached a new technological level where combat operations are increasingly shifting to the realm of unmanned systems, and the majority of strikes — at both the tactical and operational-strategic levels — are carried out using attack drones and missiles.
The protracted nature of the war and its intensity have created a need for low-cost, mass-produced weapons. Sanctions have heavily restricted Russia’s ability to manufacture its own weapons, so Moscow is increasingly relying on its allies for the raw materials and technology it can no longer make at home.
China has become one such source, and although Beijing continues to insist it remains neutral in the war, our investigation at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center has traced exactly where that supply chain runs. An analysis of procurement documents from inside Russia shows that Jilin Chemical Fiber Group, a Chinese state-owned company, has repeatedly supplied Russia’s Alabuga special economic zone with PAN precursor — the raw material used to manufacture the carbon fiber composites in Russia’s Geran attack drones. The paper trail, drawn from freight tenders and shipment records spanning nearly four years, offers what we believe is the clearest documentary evidence yet that Chinese state-owned enterprises are not bystanders to Russia’s war — they are active suppliers and potential beneficiaries of it.
This Chinese channel allows Moscow not only to obtain sanctioned goods through re-export via front companies but also to purchase them directly from Chinese manufacturers. Despite this, Beijing continues to emphasize that China maintains an “impartial stance” on the war and is ready to work with both sides to achieve peace.
As of the second half of this year, Russia had begun active production and deployment of the Geran 3/4/5 jet drones. At this stage, their manufacturing is impossible without the resource base China provides. A key component in the production of these strike drones is the turbojet engines, which are manufactured and exported by Chinese companies. This is one area where the Russian military-industrial complex is dependent on Beijing.
However, there is another critical area on which Russian industries depend: the supply of raw materials and PAN precursors for producing carbon fiber, the primary material used by Russian companies, notably Alabuga, to manufacture airframes for various models of strike drones.
As of this year, the Russian market’s dependence on carbon fiber imports stands at 66%, and Russian UAV production consumes 1,800 metric tons of carbon fiber. By 2028, consumption is expected to rise to 2,800 metric tons.
Our investigation established that Alabuga-Fiber announced tenders for freight forwarding services, including delivery, export customs clearance, and cargo insurance from China. In total, at least nine tenders have been published since 2022; the most recent tender was published on June 6.
In eight of the published tenders, the contract specifies the delivery of PAN precursors in containers to the Alabuga-Fiber warehouse from a warehouse at an address matching that of the Chinese state-owned company Jilin Chemical Fiber Group. According to Alabuga-Fiber documentation, starting in October 2022, the company was to receive at least 177 shipping containers (40HQ) and at least 51 Eurotrucks.
The data uncovered by our investigation provides grounds to view the Chinese company Jilin Chemical Fiber Group as a potentially significant link in the supply chain supporting the Russian military-industrial complex.
The company should be a priority for investigation by sanctions authorities in the United States. This involves not only the possible inclusion of Jilin Chemical Fiber Group on sanctions lists but also the application of broader restrictions, particularly regarding chemical products. The Russian recipient and affiliated companies in the Alabuga special economic zone, customs brokerage firms, transport operators, and insurance companies should also be included.
The expansion of Russian-Chinese industrial cooperation poses a threat not only to Ukraine. Russia is effectively establishing a model of mass military production, in which China’s industrial base provides access to components, raw materials, electronics, engines, and manufacturing equipment, while Russian enterprises carry out final assembly and adapt the products for wartime conditions.
In the long term, this could enable Russia to steadily increase its production of attack drones, reduce production costs, and build up significant stockpiles of air-attack capabilities. Practical experience in deploying such systems against Ukraine simultaneously provides the Russian defense-industrial complex with data to improve designs, navigation, air-defense evasion capabilities, and the organization of massive attacks.
These developments will have implications beyond the Russia-Ukraine war, for the security of NATO’s eastern flank, maritime communications, and the critical infrastructure of Europe and Western partners in other regions.
SANCTION PUTIN’S WAR MACHINE — JUST DON’T HAND TRUMP ANOTHER BLANK TARIFF CHECK
Our investigation shows, in documented detail, that China’s industrial base is not a passive bystander to this war but an active supplier to it, despite what Beijing continues to claim in public. Without cutting off Russia’s access to PAN precursors, carbon materials, electronics, and engines, its ability to scale up the production of strike UAVs will persist.
Every container of PAN precursor that reaches Alabuga becomes another drone aimed at Ukrainian cities, and every month this channel stays open, the industrial ties between Moscow and Beijing grow harder to unwind. That is a choice Western governments can still make, and the evidence for making it is now on the table.
Anton Zemlianyi is a senior analyst at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center.