The Trump administration believes that by placing increasing pressure on Iran’s oil sector, it will enhance its leverage over Tehran. Since the ceasefire talks have come to a standstill, Washington states that it can continue its naval blockade indefinitely, thus worsening the economic situation of the Iranian regime. However, a decrease in oil revenues does not automatically weaken an authoritarian regime.
Numerous authoritarian regimes, including Azerbaijan, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, have experienced falling oil revenues for decades and remain in power today. From a political point of view, what matters is not merely how much oil revenue an authoritarian government loses, but how dependent the institutions that maintain its power are on that revenue.
Oil income allows authoritarian governments to reward their political elite and pay for their security forces. If oil income falls, governments will have less money to maintain these arrangements. Political elites might then be more inclined to defect, security forces might become less reliable, and it might become harder to contain popular dissatisfaction. Yet political loyalty is not always secured by money; leaders can also rely on other kinds of support, such as nationalism, military victories, and ethnic connections. These alternative sources of loyalty can become particularly important when declining revenues make it more difficult for governments to maintain the financial arrangements that previously supported the regime.
For example, the Aliyev government in Azerbaijan shows how alternative sources of cohesion can enable an authoritarian regime to remain in power even as its oil wealth declines. Having reached a peak in oil production in 2010, the country has since suffered a continuous fall in output and has gone through periods of serious economic difficulty. Nevertheless, the regime’s key institutions, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party and its security apparatus, have stayed united, with no major defections occurring that would have threatened the regime. Ilham Aliyev has used forms of political support beyond oil revenues; he has also tapped into his father Heydar Aliyev’s legacy to bolster his own legitimacy. The long-running conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has boosted nationalism, and Aliyev’s 2023 victory has further strengthened his position.
In Equatorial Guinea, the Obiang regime has remained in power despite sharply declining oil production and economic pressure has increased. Instead of relying entirely on oil revenues, Obiang has secured the loyalty of both the military and the political institutions, to some extent, through ethnic connections. Members of his Fang ethnic group have long held important positions in the military and in the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea.
IRAN’S 1988 MASSACRE NEVER REALLY ENDED
Washington is considering whether it can apply greater economic pressure to induce Tehran to change its actions. The Iranian regime has already been at war with both the United States and Israel for several months and has also suffered attacks on its infrastructure, faced sanctions, and had its oil trade restricted. Yet despite the economic difficulties it has encountered, the regime has not collapsed, and further external pressure might not necessarily lead to that outcome.
Ongoing attacks could instead promote nationalism and cause major political elites and members of the security forces to align more closely with the regime, rather than encouraging the defections needed to weaken it. Instead of expecting a change of regime, Washington should pursue diplomacy designed to obtain specific Iranian concessions and actions toward de-escalation. Although economic pressure can offer some leverage, its success should ultimately be measured by whether it changes Tehran’s behavior, not by whether it causes enough economic hardship to bring the regime down.
Yagiz Sullu, Ph.D., is the founder and lead analyst at Sullu Strategic Advisory LLC and holds a Ph.D. in Planning, Governance, and Globalization from Virginia Tech.