After Delta Force swooped into Caracas on Jan. 3 and captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, there was widespread anticipation that the country would return to democracy. Better times were thought on the near horizon after more than a decade in which the economy shrank by three-quarters and about a quarter of the population migrated due to political persecution and poverty. The Venezuelan opposition, which had been jailed and exiled for the last quarter-century, was suddenly provided a gift from the American president. Maria Corina Machado, who saw her party’s 2024 presidential election victory thrown out by Maduro, started making plans to return home.
Six months after Maduro’s ouster, none of the above has come to pass.
That’s because the Trump administration decided to play it safe. Instead of uprooting the entire Chavista system root-to-branch and quickly holding elections, President Donald Trump opted to leave the existing structure in place for the purposes of maintaining order. The same senior Venezuelan officials, such as Diosdado Cabello, who were charged with smuggling drugs into the United States and still have FBI bounties on their heads, are now walking with U.S. officials as if they’ve been granted immunity. Rather than organize Machado’s immediate return, Washington asked her to stay in the U.S., lest she cause problems after she crossed the Venezuelan border. And while U.S. officials talked about the eventual return of democracy, it wasn’t exactly the first, second, or even third item on the U.S. checklist. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, an avid Venezuela hawk as a senator, was now prioritizing stability over everything else.
At this point, the Trump administration is essentially running Venezuela as an American protectorate. This is a bit too much even for the pro-American Machado. She wanted a productive and healthy relationship with Washington, but not one characterized by Venezuelan officials serving at the pleasure of an American president. Her attempts to return to Venezuela have been repeatedly stymied. Former U.S. officials who once worked for Trump, including John Bolton and Elliot Abrams, are writing commentaries about how Washington’s strategy for Venezuela is not only foolish but also a betrayal of democratic values.
The only question, though, is why anybody actually believed Trump was serious about uprooting Venezuela’s autocracy in the first place. Nothing in his background, copious media interviews, or past actions would lead to that conclusion. And yet for some inexplicable reason, the expectation among the Venezuelan opposition and Venezuela’s diaspora communities in South Florida was that the Chavismo system would be dead and buried as soon as Maduro was locked up in a New York jail.
Trump, though, isn’t George W. Bush, Barack Obama, or Joe Biden. He doesn’t particularly care about democracy promotion, has no issues working with autocrats who are force multipliers for U.S. policy, and, for the most part, he only cares about human rights to the extent it benefits his wider geopolitical agenda. In other words, it doesn’t really matter how many dissidents you jail, how weak your institutions are, or whether your security services are even competent — the only factor for foreign leaders to consider in their quest to pass the Trump test is whether you are willing to take Washington’s orders.
Thus far, Delcy Rodriguez, Maduro’s former vice president, is passing the test with flying colors. Despite her occasional nationalistic language to mollify her, at times, rowdy Chavista political base, Rodriguez has made an internal calculation that catering to the Trump administration on the big items — oil production, the economy, and America’s access to Venezuela’s oil and mineral resources — is the key to her staying in power and out of U.S. prison. Venezuela’s crude oil exports increased to 35.3 million barrels a day in May, a nearly 60% jump from the same time a year earlier. The U.S. is now on the receiving end of much of that oil thanks to Trump’s waiving of sanctions. And just as important from the White House’s perspective, Cuba, which used to receive around 70,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil every day, is no longer a delivery destination.
It’s difficult to overstate just how much leverage the Trump administration now has over Venezuela’s interim government. Washington not only oversees Venezuela’s oil revenue but effectively controls it by greenlighting how Caracas can spend its own money. Rodriguez is so concerned with the U.S. boot on her neck that she reportedly asked the U.S. State Department to sign off on some of her Cabinet picks, an exercise in humiliation that probably has Hugo Chavez rolling around in his grave. And because U.S. sanctions over Venezuela are not permanently lifted, only suspended, Trump can always reapply them if he feels the interim government is getting too ornery.
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In short, the current reality is a pretty good one for Trump, who views power, leverage, and wealth as the epitome of success. Right now, he’s got all of it. From his perspective, why fix something that isn’t broken? It’s a question Machado has a ready-made answer for: because there are still political prisoners locked up in Venezuela’s jails, and the authorities you, Mr. President, are talking to, stole the last election.
For Trump, that’s just not a persuasive argument.