Every American president hopes he will be the one to solve the Iran problem through diplomacy. So far, none has succeeded.
Now, President Donald Trump appears to be considering another agreement with Tehran. Before Washington celebrates a diplomatic breakthrough, it should remember a simple lesson: The Islamic Republic has spent decades using negotiations not to resolve crises, but to outlast them.
For Tehran, diplomacy is often less about compromise than survival. When sanctions bite, it talks. When military pressure rises, it negotiates. When its economy weakens, it seeks relief. The goal is not necessarily to reach a lasting solution. The goal is to gain time.
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That is why Trump should be careful not to repeat former President Barack Obama’s Iran mistake.
Supporters of renewed negotiations argue that any agreement is preferable to conflict. After years of instability in the Middle East, that argument is understandable. Americans are tired of wars, and few want to see another military confrontation in the region.
But avoiding a crisis today only to face a larger one tomorrow is not a strategy.
The Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal was sold as a way to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and reduce regional tensions. Instead, many critics argue that sanctions relief provided the regime with economic breathing room while its support for proxy groups and regional influence continued largely unchanged.
The lesson is not that diplomacy never works. The lesson is that agreements alone do not change the nature of a regime.
Many of the strongest warnings against another weak agreement come not from Washington think tanks but from Iranians themselves. They have watched the regime imprison dissidents, suppress protests, censor independent voices, and execute political opponents. They understand better than anyone that promises made under pressure often disappear once that pressure is lifted.
A government that repeatedly breaks faith with its own people will struggle to earn the trust of the international community.
The central question is not whether Tehran will sign an agreement. It probably will. The real question is whether the regime will honor it when circumstances change.
History gives little reason for confidence.
Iran’s leaders understand that time is one of their most valuable strategic assets. Every round of negotiations creates breathing room. Every temporary agreement reduces pressure. Every delay provides an opportunity to regroup, rebuild, and reposition.
That is why any future agreement should be judged not by the ceremony surrounding its signing but by the results it produces.
Will it permanently block Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon?
Will it prevent sanctions relief from strengthening the institutions that destabilize the region?
Will it contain meaningful consequences if Tehran violates its commitments?
If the answer to those questions is no, then the agreement is not solving the problem. It is postponing it.
Some supporters of negotiations argue that if Iran eventually breaks an agreement, the world will finally see the regime’s true intentions. Perhaps. But by then, Tehran may have gained years of economic relief, diplomatic legitimacy, and valuable time to recover.
The United States should not confuse delay with progress.
Trump built much of his foreign policy around the belief that strength deters aggression. In the case of Iran, history suggests he has a point. The regime tends to make concessions when pressure increases, not when pressure is relieved.
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The goal should not be a diplomatic headline or a temporary pause in tensions. The goal should be a durable outcome that protects American interests, strengthens regional stability, and prevents a future crisis.
The problem has never been getting Iran to sign an agreement — the problem is what Iran does after the ink dries. Trump should remember that before repeating Obama’s mistake.
Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, Middle East security, Iraqi politics, and regional affairs.